Note, A Birthright Rearticulated: The Politics of Bilingual Education by Sekhon, Nirej S.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Faculty Publications By Year Faculty Publications
1-1-1999
Note, A Birthright Rearticulated: The Politics of
Bilingual Education
Nirej S. Sekhon
Georgia State University College of Law, nsekhon@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/faculty_pub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Education Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications By Year by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nirej Sekhon, Note, A Birthright Rearticulated: The Politics of Bilingual Education, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1407 (1999).
A BIRTHRIGHT REARTICULATED:
THE POLITICS OF
BILINGUAL EDUCATION
NiRFj SEKHON*
This Note addresses Proposition 227, California's recently enacted voter initiative
banning bilingual education in public schools. Nirej Sekhon argues that tre propo-
sition functions rhetorically as a racially inflected exhortation to nonwhite peoples
in the United States. The proposition equates American identity with white identity
by claiming English as the birthright privilege of white Americans. As sai, the
proposition is continuous with the history of language and education politics in the
United States. The author concludes by sketching the broad challenge that his anal-
ysis poses to current legal mechanisms.
INTRODUCTION
President Bush once sent forth hundreds of Peace Corps volun-
teers with these affirming words: "English literacy has become the
key to progress.... [Y]our language came to you as a birthright ..... I
Bush's words evoke colonial nostalgia.2 "Progress" is imagined as a
civilizing mission with young white Americans as its agents.3 In a
world where express invocations of race are thought distasteful, lan-
guage is left to structure the relationship between "civilizer" and "un-
civilized."'4 For the "civilizer," English is an inherent capacity, a
birthright; for the "uncivilized," English is a learned capacity. The no-
* This meager footnote is nowhere near commodious enough to allow for all the
thanks that are due. I, however, owe an especial debt of gratitude to Professor K.A.
Appiah, Iris Bennett, Carol Kaplan, and Keith Buell for their energetic criticism.
1 James Crawford, Hold Your Tongue 206 (1992).
2 See id. at 49-51 (describing U.S. colonial policy as creating "sense of Anglo-Saxon
purpose" mandating introduction of English). United States colonial policy viewed Eng-
lish's spread as synonymous with progress. American colonial policy was especially inten-
sive in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. See id. at 49-50. In Puerto Rico, three
generations of schoolchildren were subjected to forced English-medium schooling before
the policy was recognized as a failure. See id. at 51.
3 See Dennis Carlson, Respondent: Self Education-Identity, Self, and the New Poli-
tics of Education, in Power/Knowledge/Pedagogy. The Meaning of Democratic Education
in Unsettling Tunes 191, 192 (Dennis Carlson & Michael NV. Apple eds., 1998) (describing
relationship between white identity and colonialism); see also Ronald Takaki, Strangers
from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans 21-23 (1998) (describing white
Hawaiian settlers' attitudes towards immigrant Chinese laborers).
4 See Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Language Minorities: Forgotten Victims of Discrimina-
ion, 11 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 747, 753 (1997) (noting that society feels more comfortable fo-
cusing on language rather than race).
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tion of English as "birthright" casts light on why primary fluency in
non-English languages is perceived as a problem rather than a re-
source in the United States. 5
It was in the spirit of rectifying a problem that California voters
approved the antibilingual education initiative Proposition 2276 in
June of 1998.7 Ron Unz, a wealthy Silicon Valley businessman, was
Proposition 227's principal sponsor.8 Unz contended that California's
public schools had stopped teaching English to "immigrant" children
under the guise of providing bilingual education. 9 Proposition 227 re-
quires educational programs in which non-English-speaking students
are "taught English... in English."'10 Although opponents challenged
Proposition 227 in court, they did not succeed in enjoining its
implementation."
During the campaign to enact Proposition 227, supporters di-
rected criticism at "late-exit," transitional bilingual education
(TBE).12 These were programs organized around the ambition that
students would transition from their native language into English over
a five- to six-year period.' 3 Proposition 227, however, prohibits more
than just late-exit TBE programs. Its reach encompasses a range of
programs imprecisely labeled "bilingual education. 1 4 More startling
5 See Crawford, supra note 1, at 207 (asking what accounts for "Americans' obstinate
monolingualism").
6 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 227 (West) (codified at Cal. Educ. Code §§ 300-340
(West Supp. 1999)) [hereinafter Prop. 227]. The full text of Proposition 227 is reproduced
in the Appendix to this Note.
7 See George Skelton, A Voters' Primer on the Lessons of the Open Primary, L.A.
Tmes, June 4, 1998, at A3 (noting Proposition 227's passage). Sixty-one percent of those
voting voted in favor of Proposition 227. See Richard Lee Colvin & Doug Smith, Prop.
227 Foes Vow to Block It Despite Wide Vote Margin, L.A. Times, June 4, 1998, at Al. The
California Constitution grants to the electorate the power to propose and approve (or re-
ject) statutes and constitutional amendments. See Cal. Const. art. II, § 8(a). In order to
have an initiative put to the voters, the sponsors must submit a petition to the Secretary of
State that contains signatures equal in number to at least five percent (for statutory amend-
ments) and eight percent (for constitutional amendments) of the total votes cast in the
previous gubernatorial election. See id. § 8(b). A proposition may not embrace more than
one subject or contain alternative provisions. See id. § 8(d)-(f).
8 See Margot Hornblower, The Man Behind Prop. 227, Time, June 8, 1998, at 56.
9 See Ron K. Unz, Bilingual Is a Damaging Myth, L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1997, at MS.
10 Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 305.
11 See Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (refusing to
enjoin implementation of Proposition 227 after challenge by "limited English proficient"
students).
12 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 65, 124 and accompanying text.
14 Intuitively, the term "bilingual education" suggests a program designed to foster bi-
lingualism. This is generally not the case. Most bilingual programs are designed to facili-
tate transition from a non-English language into English. See infra note 62 (describing
various kinds of programs); see also infra Part II.C (same). Unless specified, I shall use the
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is that over seventy percent of students in California vho were eligible
for such programs never received any type of special bilingual
education.'-
In the realm of racial meaning,16 Proposition 227 functions as an
exhortation to public schools and non-English-speaking people who
are primarily nonwhite:' 7 "You have to learn our language." The ex-
hortation equates authentic "Americanness" with "whiteness" by con-
structing "the other"' 8 as she who does not know "our" language.
The proposition never enunciates a specific racial appellation. "Lan-
guage" does all of the work.
Proposition 227 positions English as "our" language by construct-
ing it as our unlearned capacity: It is our birthright. The proposition
differentiates "us" from "them" by denominating them in terms of an
essential inability to call English their own. They must learn it. Prop-
osition 227 not only demands that they learn our language, it demands
that they "forget" their own.19 In so demanding, the proposition not
only unleashes a salvo in the bilingual education debate, but is a mo-
ment in the broader debate over assimilation and acculturation.20
term "bilingual" to refer to any educational program that would have been designated as
such by the California Department of Education.
15 See California Dep't of Educ., Fact Book 1997-98: Handbook of Education Informa-
tion 46 [hereinafter California Fact Book].
16 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317,355-57 (1987) (decoupling racial meaning
from conscious racist intent).
17 Spanish-speaking students constitute the largest segment of California's non-English-
speaking student population. They comprise 80.2% of California's 1.38 million non-Eng-
lish-speaking student population. See California Fact Book, supra note 15, at 45-46. The
remaining 19.8% speak primarily Asian languages: Vietnamese, 3.3%; Hmong, 2.3%; Can-
tonese, 1.9%; Filipino, 1-5%; Khmer, 1.4%; Korean, 1.2%. See id. at 46. In this note, I
shall often refer to Latina/o and Asian people collectively. The terms "Latinafo" and
"Asian," independently, conceal tremendous heterogeneity, let alone when conjoined.
Proposition 227, however, pays no heed to such heterogeneity. Rather, it is concerned with
highlighting Latinalos' and Asians' common "deficiency": not having English. See infra
Part I.B. It is in the interest of representing this dynamic that I use the designations Asian
and Latina/o jointly-not in the interest of making essential claims about the relationship
between the two.
18 See, e.g., Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transfor-
mation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harm. L Rev. 1331, 1372-73
(1988) (explaining that articulation of debased other "reinforces identification with the
dominant group" and helps create illusion of its unity); see also text accompanying notes
75-77.
19 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
20 See Peter Beinart, How the California G.O.P Got a Spanish Lesson, Time, May 18,
1998, at 58 (noting Republicans' accusations that bilingual education produces a "culturally
alien... immigrant underclass"); Hornblower, supra note 8, at 56 (quoting Unzs thoughts
on America's assimilation of immigrants); Andrew Phillips, Language Wars: Spanish
Speakers Fight to Overturn Bilingual Educatiofi, Maclean's, June 1, 1998, at 34, 36 (noting
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Proposition 227 does not radically break from the bilingual edu-
cation programs it renders illegal. Rather, it is a more violent2' articu-
lation of the same underlying imperative: to consolidate America's
status as a monoglot English-speaking nation.22 Both bilingual and
English-only educational schemes tend to emphasize English's cen-
trality while demonizing primary fluency in a non-English language.
This Note examines the homologous ways in which this impera-
tive animates Proposition 227 and its predecessors.23 Part I describes
the proposition and the terms of its passage; it then shows how Propo-
sition 227 reestablishes English as the cultural property of white
Americans. Part II situates the proposition in a broader discourse on
Americanness. Americanization, 24 immigration, and educational pol-
icy have all contributed to the production of very particular notions of
what it means to be an American. Bilingual education programs have
reflected the particularity of such notions in that most bilingual pro-
grams never aimed to produce actual bilinguals. Part III suggests how
the analyses in Parts I and II may complicate a standard reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause2- and the Equal
that Proposition 227 is about "how best to integrate the second-biggest wave of immigra-
tion this century into the American mainstream").
21 I do not use the term "violent" to refer singularly to physical force as it is conven-
tionally imagined. Nor do I use it to refer to the psychic impact that draconian language
policies might have upon particular categories of people, although such a use would surely
be appropriate. Rather, "violent" refers to "performative force": the images and mean-
ings mobilized by particular arrangements of words and expressions. See Jacques Derrida,
Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority" (Mary Quaintance trans.), in
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice 3, 6-7 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992).
22 This assertion should not be read to mean that teaching English is not an important
function of American public schools. Rather, the statement (like this Note, more gener-
ally) seeks to question the way in which English's importance is imagined and represented
in certain discourses.
23 The predecessors to which I refer include many-although not necessarily all-
programs encompassed by the label "bilingual education." See infra Part II.C.
24 "Americanization" refers not only to a general process of acculturation, but also to
an early twentieth-century movement whose ambition was systematically to make "Ameri-
cans" out of Eastern and Southern Europeans. See Robert A. Carlson, The Americaniza-
tion Syndrome: A Quest for Conformity 5 (1987).
25 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
For the purposes of this Note, a "standard reading" is one that takes identity as a
given: that is, a fixed attribute. Such readings imagine the law to operate upon people who
are possessed of stable identities. This Note takes the view that identities are inherently
unstable. That is to say, identities are constantly being constituted, consolidated, and de-
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Education Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA).2 6
I
PROPosIION 227
A. A Troublesome Proposition
Proposition 227 inaugurates an educational program in which
English is "taught in English."27 A violent assumption undergirds
Proposition 227's English "immersion" scheme: Immigrant children
will only learn English if they are submerged in it.2 The proposition
reaffirms English's status as America's "public language";29 it follows
that one needs to learn it in order to achieve "social advancement." 30
Admittedly, California's public schools have done a poor job educat-
ing immigrant children 31 Proposition 227 squarely ascribes the failure
to bilingual education.3 2 According to the proposition's preamble,
this is shameful on account of immigrant children's unique capacity to
acquire "full fluency" in English if "heavily exposed to [it] in the class-
room. '33 Because Proposition 227 only permits non-English lan-
guages to be taught as foreign languages to English speakers3 it
stroyed. See generally Michael Omi & Howard WVinant, Racial Formation in the United
States: From the 1960s to the 1990s (1994). These processes operate through myriad dis-
courses of which the law is prominent.
26 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1994).
27 Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 305 ("[AIll children in California public schools shall be
taught English by being taught in English.").
28 The expression "sink or swim" was often used to describe Proposition 227's immer-
sion scheme. See, e.g., Nick Anderson & Amy Pyle, Bilingual Classes a Knotty Issue, LA.
Times, May 18, 1998, at R2; Editorial, Two Languages, Two Strategies, LA. Tunes (Ven-
tura County Edition), Oct. 11, 1998, at B16, available in 1998 WL 18882601.
29 Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 300(a).
30 Id. § 300(b).
31 See, e.g., id. § 300(d) ("The public schools of California currently do a poor job of
educating immigrant children,... demonstrated by the current high drop-out rates and low
English literacy levels of many immigrant children .... ."); see also Nick Anderson, State's
Students Rank Below National Average, L.A. Tunes, July 22, 1998, at Al (noting poor
standardized test scores for students not fluent in English); Tna Nguyen, Remedial Read-
ing Efforts in California Not on Same Page, L.A. Tunes, Oct. 4, 1998, at Al (reporting
inadequacy of remedial literacy programs); Louis Sahagun, Facing the Poverty Factor, L.A.
Tunes, Nov. 1, 1998, at Al (discussing education of poor immigrants in California public
schools).
32 See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 300(d) (stating that "costly experimental language
programs [have] failed] over the past two decades" to educate immigrant children). How-
ever, singularly ascribing blame, if any at all, to bilingual education programs is unjustified
because most non-English-speaking children were never in them. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
33 Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 300(e).
34 See id. § 311(a) (creating waiver for students fluent in English).
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implies that fluency in two languages cannot be fostered at the same
time.35
Proposition 227 outlines the scheme that replaces California's
various bilingual education programs.36 Section 305 requires that,
prior to "English learners" entering English-only classrooms, they
spend no more than one year in transitional ("sheltered English im-
mersion") programs that impart a "good working knowledge of Eng-
lish."' 37 During the one-year immersion, schools are encouraged to
mix children of different language backgrounds and allowed to mix
children of different ages.38
Proposition 227 does not concretely describe an implementation
scheme. This lacuna created considerable confusion in the wake of its
passage. 39 More alarming, however, is that the proposition imple-
ments a unitary instructional program that is backed by questionable
empirical research.40 In so doing, the proposition eschews the notion
that localities should exert control over their schools41 and prevents
schools from addressing the specific needs of different communities.42
Proposition 227's expansive reach should not be underesti-
mated.4 3 In the name of doing away with bilingual education, Propo-
35 See id. §§ 300(e), 305, 311(a) (stating that immigrant children learn English if they
are "heavily exposed to it," requiring that English be taught in English, and prohibiting
non-English language instruction to students not already fluent in English); infra text ac-
companying note 136.
36 See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 305.
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 See Nick Anderson & Doug Smith, State Board Grapples with Prop. 227, L.A.
Times, Aug. 1, 1998, at A16 (describing uncertainty over how transition to "immersion"
would be effected); Tma Nguyen, Loophole Lets Schools Delay Prop. 227, L.A. Times, July
30, 1998, at A3 (noting school districts' confusion over implementation strategy).
40 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 1, Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (No. C 98-2252
CAL). But see Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 (recognizing policy debate among educa-
tors and scholars regarding best program and noting that each side in case has "extensive
evidence and arguments, including research studies" to support its position). If the goal is
teaching English, it has been shown that transitional bilingual education (TBE) programs
are more effective than immersion programs. See Geoffrey Nunberg, Lingo Jingo: Eng-
lish-Only and the New Nativism, Am. Prospect, July-Aug. 1997, at 40, 44.
41 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 24-29, Valeria G. (No. C 98-2252 CAL). Some California Republicans found
in the "local control" issue a reason to oppose Proposition 227. See Cathleen Decker,
Rivals for Governor Face Off in Lively Forum, L.A. Tunes, May 14, 1998, at Al.
42 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 23, Valeria G. (No. C 98-2252 CAL).
43 Proposition 227 does allow for waivers to the immersion scheme it inaugurates. See
Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 310. Such waivers, however, are only available for children who
know English, children older than 10 years of age, and children with "special needs." Id.
§ 311. Parents must personally visit their child's school to obtain a waiver. Only if 20 such
waivers are applied for in a particular grade can the school offer a bilingual class for that
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sition 227 prohibits successful dual immersion programs as well.44
These programs, which seek to produce bilingual/biliterate students,
capitalize on students' native fluency by mixing Spanish and English
speakers.45 In contrast, Proposition 227 not only alters curricular sub-
stance, but transforms the physical space in which that substance is
communicated. Posters and artwork in Spanish are not becoming of
an English-only classroom.4
Proposition 227 has a political genealogy in that it is the latest in a
line of English-only initiatives.47 California was among the first states
to pass an English-only law with Proposition 63 in 1986, which
amended the California Constitution. s Although ostensibly sym-
bolic, 49 Proposition 63 enabled English-only proponents to suggest
that bilingual education was illegal.5 0
grade. Other requirements also may apply depending upon the provision under which a
waiver is applied for. See id. §§ 310-311. The requirements imposed upon parents present
obvious problems for parents of non-English-speaking students, who are primarily working
class and poor. See Ofelia Garcia & Ricardo Otheguy, The Bilingual Education of Cuban-
American Children in Dade County's Ethnic Schools, in Policy and Practice in Bilingual
Education 93, 93 (Ofelia Garcia & Colin Baker eds., 1995) ("Children who speak lan-
guages other than English in the United States come mostly from working-class homes or
from the homes of the poor .... "). Among the proposition's other prominent features is a
section granting parents standing to sue schools, schools board members, teachers, and
other elected officials for failing to implement Proposition 227. See Prop. 227, supra note
6, § 320. The proposition also ensures its own longevity by requiring a two-thirds vote in
each legislative house for amendment. See id. § 335.
44 Although "dual immersion" is a kind of bilingual education, "bilingual education"
generally refers to TBE, whose purpose is gently to facilitate transition into the English
language. See infra note 61-62 and accompanying text. For a clinical description of differ-
ent kinds of language programs, see Colin Baker, Key Issues in Bilingualism and Bilingual
Education 82 (1988).
45 See Nick Anderson, A Boomtown of Bilingual Education, LA. Tunes, May 25,1998,
at Al (noting that mixed student groups are ideal for dual-immersion type programs);
Editorial, Some Bilingual Programs Deserve to Be Saved, S.F. Chron., Aug. 16,1998, at 6
(noting successes of dual-immersion programs).
46 See Fred Alvarez & Jennifer Hamm, No Habla Espanoh Spanish Is Banished From
Classrooms as Teachers Implement English Immersion, LA. Times (Ventura County Edi-
tion), Sept. 6, 1998, at B1, available in 1998 WL 18871685 (describing removal of Spanish
posters and books from classroom); Liz Seymour, Schools Set for New Era of English-
Only, L.A. Times (Orange County Edition), Sept. 8, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL
18872106 (same).
47 At least 22 states now have such laws. See Cecilia Wong, Language is Speech, 30
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 277, 278 & n.6 (1996) (listing state statutes).
48 See Cal. Const. art. III, § 6. Proposition 63 passed in 1986 with a 73% 0,majority. See
The 1986 Election, 17 Cal. J. 587, 592 (1986).
49 Proposition 63 did little more than declare English to be California's official lan-
guage. It left implementation to the legislature without specifying what implementation
might mean. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 6.
50 See Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken
Here, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L L Rev. 293, 301-03 (1989) (analyzing English-only laws). Propo-
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In Proposition 63's wake, California voters passed a host of pro-
positions that implicated race and identity.51 Commentaries in the
popular press were quick to articulate Proposition 227's connection to
these propositions.5 2 Supporters of Proposition 227 feared that it
would become conceptually linked with Proposition 187, which was
pilloried as virulently anti-immigrant.5 3 The linkage was especially
damning given that anti-bilingual education organizers have targeted
Latina/o and Asian communities in California (and the United States,
more generally).5 4 Proposition 227 supporters' fear of a 227/187
linkage suggests an awareness that the bilingual education debate was
racially circumscribed.
Consequently, it is unsurprising that Proposition 227's supporters
went to great lengths to represent the proposition as both for the ben-
efit of, and supported by, non-English-speaking minorities.5 5 The
sition 63 passed just before California's bilingual education law was scheduled to sunset.
See Cal. Educ. Code § 62000.2(e) (West 1989) (setting sunset date of June 30, 1987).
51 See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 209 (West) (codified at Cal. Const. art. I, § 31 (West
Supp. 1999)) (eliminating public affirmative action programs); 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop.
187 (West) (codified in scattered sections of Cal. Educ., Gov't, Health & Safety, Penal,
Well. & Inst. Codes) [hereinafter Prop. 187] (restricting public services for undocumented
immigrants).
52 See Bettina Boxall, Unusual Crusade: Que Pasa Aqui?, L.A. 'imes, Apr. 5, 1998, at
BI (discussing Propositions 187, 209, and 227); Carl Ingram, Wilson Backs Ballot Measure
to Ban Bilingual Education, L.A. Times, May 19, 1998, at Al (same); Kathleen Les, No
Mas for Bilingual, 29 Cal. J. 24, 24 (1998) (observing that Latina/o voters linked Prop. 227
to Prop. 187 and Prop. 209); Tony Perry, Social Issues Bring Out Differences, L.A. Times,
Sept. 27, 1998, at A3 (comparing senatorial candidates' positions on Propositions 187, 209,
and 227); Amy Pyle et al., Latino Voter Participation Doubled Since '94 Primary, L.A.
Times, June 4, 1998, at Al (noting Latina/o voting patterns for Propositions 187, 209, and
227).
53 See Ingram, supra note 52, at Al (discussing Proposition 227 sponsors' fear that
Wilson's endorsement would invite voters to link Propositions 227 and 187, which Wilson
also endorsed). Proposition 187 proposed denying all but emergency medical services to
undocumented persons in California. See Prop. 187, supra note 51, § 6. It also proposed
more extensive monitoring and reporting of those suspected of being undocumented. See
id. § 4. Legal action blocked Proposition 187's implementation. See League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Had this not occurred,
Proposition 187 would have harnessed institutions such as public schools for the purpose of
identifying and reporting anyone who might "reasonably" have appeared undocumented.
See Prop. 187, supra note 51, § 7(d).
54 Cf. Crawford, supra note 1, at 122 (contrasting English-only movement's treatment
of Latina/o and Asian communities with hands-off treatment of Soviet Jewish immigrants
in Brooklyn, New York).
55 Proposition 227 asserts as much in its preamble. See Prop. 227, supra note 6,
§ 300(b) ("Immigrant parents are eager to have their children acquire a good knowledge of
English .... "). Proposition 227's chief sponsor, Ron Unz, also made it clear that he in-
tended the proposition to benefit Latinas/os. See Unz, supra note 9, at M5. Unz cleverly
appointed Jaime Escalante (the East Los Angeles math teacher represented in the film
Stand and Deliver) to be the honorary spokesperson of Proposition 227's campaign organi-
zation. See Jenifer Warren, Hooked on Politics, L.A. Times, July 16, 1998, at A3. Spanish
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popular press helped create an atmosphere in which it was difficult
not to believe that the majority of Latina/o voters supported Proposi-
tion 227.56 However, polling results suggest that supporters' claims
were tenuous at best. The majority of Latina/o-identified voters cast
their ballots against the proposition.57 According to polling data,
Proposition 227 was most popular with those who described them-
selves as white, conservative, and male.58
Post-election results published in the Los Angeles Times begin to
suggest why Proposition 227 supporters might have voted as they did.
Seventy-three percent of those polled before the election who planned
to vote in favor of the proposition were going to do so because they
believed that "if you live in America you need to speak English." 59
This explanation invites two interpretations; both equate American-
ness with English fluency. In the first interpretation, English is an or-
ganic marker of Americanness: To be American is to speak English.
The second interpretation emphasizes English's instrumentality: Be-
cause English happens to be America's public language, one needs to
know it in order to participate in society. Both of these interpreta-
tions highlight Proposition 227's peculiarity. Its sponsors' purported
objective was to provide "English for the children."60 This very objec-
five, however, animated California's bilingual education law as well:
television ads sponsored by Los Angeles mayor Richard Riordan stated that he "supports
Proposition 227 to give your children a chance." Nick Anderson, LA. Teachers Group
Pledges Defiance if Prop. 227 Passes, LA. Times, May 21, 1998, at A3.
56 The L.A. Times reported that Latinaslos favored Proposition 227. See Bettina
Boxall, Popularity Extends Past Racial Lines, LA. Tunes, May 29, 1998, at A3. For a
detailed criticism of the Proposition 227 media coverage, see James Crawford, The Bilin-
gual Education Story- Why Can't the News Media Get It Right? (last modified September
27, 1999) <http.//ourworld.compuserve.com/homepagesjwcrawvford/NAIE.htm>. James
Crawford was a journalist for Education Week. He has written extensively on language
policy in the United States. During the summer of 1998, Crawford's homepage was among
the more robust sources of electronic information regarding the politicking surrounding
Proposition 227.
57 Post-election polling revealed that 63% of voters self-identifying as Latinato voted
against Proposition 227. See Pyle, supra note 52, at Al.
58 Poll results indicated that 81% of voters identifying themselves as male Republicans
and 67% of voters identifying themselves as white voted for Proposition 227. See LA.
Times Poll (visited Sept. 24, 1999) <httpJ/www.latimes.comHOMEtNEWSIPOLLSI
exitpollsuper.htin>.
59 L.A. Tunes Poll Alert (visited Sept. 1, 1998) <http'//vvw.latimes.comfHOMEJ
NEWS/POLLS/PDF/410pa2da.pdf>. Ambiguous polling results are often mobilized for
dubious political ends. James Crawford discusses how slanted polling questions helped
produce the results that showed Latinaslos to be overwhelmingly in favor of Proposition
227. See James Crawford, Responding to Unz-Supported Claims (visited Aug. 11, 1999)
<http:/www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepagesjwcrawfordunzargs.htm>.
60 Proposition 227 and its sponsoring organization were named "English for the Chil-
dren." See Unz, supra note 9, at M5.
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It mandated instruction in non-English languages for the purpose of
"transitioning" school children into English. 6'
To the extent that many California schools may have failed to
equip their students with English fluency, there is no evidence that
factors intrinsic to bilingual education were responsible. To argue
otherwise is fatuous given the number of programs to which "bilingual
education" refers. 62 Moreover, the vast majority of California's non-
English-speaking students have known nothing but English-only edu-
cation.63 For the thirty percent enrolled in programs described as "bi-
lingual," many were in early-exit programs. Contrary to pro-
Proposition 227 rhetoric,64 such programs were quite short and often
conducted in English.65 Persistent shortages of qualified bilingual in-
structors also rendered many programs less effective than they other-
wise would have been.66
61 "Basic bilingual education" only allows for the use of pupils' native language until
they can be transferred into English language classes. See Cal. Educ. Code § 52163(a)(2)
(West 1989).
62 Most bilingual education programs in California were designed explicitly for non-
English-speaking children. These programs were created for the purpose of transitioning
such children into English, not for the purpose of developing their native fluency. Appro-
priately, such programs are called transitional bilingual education. See Baker, supra note
44, at 46. TBE programs can be broken down further into late exit and early exit. Late-
exit programs are five- to six-years long while early-exit programs are usually no more than
two. Initially, late-exit programs are conducted almost entirely in the children's native
language. By the end of the program, instruction is almost entirely in English. See J.
David Ramirez et al., Longitudinal Study of Structured English Immersion Strategy, Early-
Exit and Late-Exit Transitional Bilingual Education Programs for Language-Minority
Children 1-2 (1991).
63 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
64 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
65 Often the label "bilingual" is little more than a name. In early-exit programs, the
bilingual component is often restricted to as little as 30 minutes a day. See Ramirez, supra
note 62, at 2. Teachers in early-exit programs are, generally, not fluent in anything but
English. The same is not true for late-exit programs. See id. at 17; Crawford, supra note 1,
at 221. In short, early-exit often amounts to little more than an immersion program with
limited tutoring on the side. In Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified School District, the plaintiffs
challenged just such a program for its inadequacy. 724 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (hold-
ing that school satisfied requirement for overcoming "educational barriers" of Equal Edu-
cational Opportunity Act of 1974 (EEOA)).
66 See California Dep't of Educ., Remedying the Shortage of Teachers for Limited-
English-Proficient Students 2, 4, 7 (1991) (urging California legislature to provide funding
to hire additional qualified bilingual instructors); Laurie Olsen et al., The Unfinished Jour-
ney: Restructuring Schools in a Diverse Society 206 (1994) (noting that shortage of bilin-
gual teachers interferes with implementation of effective bilingual programs); Young Im
Yoo, Schools Are Failing All Students, L.A. Tunes, May 30, 1997, at B7 (noting persistent
shortage of bilingual teachers).
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B. A Critical Framework
Proposition 227 reacted to an idea of bilingual education that
bore scant resemblance to some of California's more salient educa-
tional realities. 67 Perhaps this should not be surprising given the sym-
bolic stature of bilingual education as a political issue.6s
Professor Rachel Moran's article, Bilingual Education as Status
Conflict, is one of few efforts within legal discourse to account for the
debate's ferocity. 69 Professor Moran invokes the notion of "status
conflict" to make sense of the bilingual education debate.70 Drawing
on Joseph Gusfield's sociological work,71 Professor Moran argues that
Hispanics have used language as "a proxy for their culture, customs,
and values." 72 As such, bilingual education confers status not just
upon Spanish, but upon a way of being. Moran's account, however,
does not even begin to address what has elsewhere been called "the
other question." 73
In his essay, "The Other Question," Homi Bhabha contends that
social domination is necessarily dependent upon "the concept of 'fix-
ity' in the ideological construction of othemess." 74 Although Bhabha
67 CL Joshua A. Fishman, 'English Only': Its Ghosts, Myths and Dangers, 74 Int'l J.
Soc. Language 125, 132 (1988) (speculating that there are more Anglo-oriented Americans
turned off to idea of bilingual education than children who have received it). Concerning
the Proposition 227 debate, Governor Pete Wilson declared: "'[lIn California's schools,
English should not be a foreign language."' Ingram, supra note 52, at Al. Wilson obvi-
ously had not spent much time studying California's educational programs. See supra note
15 and accompanying text.
68 See Kenji Hakuta, The Mirror of Language 226 (1986) (arguing that bilingual educa-
tion symbolically threatens status of English language by openly acknowledging legitimacy
of non-English languages).
69 Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 Cal. L Rev. 321
(1987).
70 Id. at 325.
71 See, e.g., Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade (1963). Gusfield employed the no-
tion of "status conflict" to explain the American Temperance Movement. Gusfield noted
that in "status politics," conflict arises where there is a discrepancy between the prestige
afforded a particular group and the prestige to which group members think themselves
entitled. See id. at 17. Gusfield insisted on the fixity of "status communities": "Status
communities are sharply delineated segments of the status system...." Id. at 21. Gusfield
pointed to racial and religious groups as examples of "status communities." See id.
72 Moran, supra note 69, at 345.
73 Homi Bhabha, The Other Question, in Contemporary Postcolonial Theory 37, 37
(Padmini Mongia ed., 1996). For discussion of his thesis, see infra notes 74, 79.
74 Id. Fixing the other is necessarily a discursive project. Elaborate studies expound
upon the other's essential characteristics. As such, studies of the other may say more
about the studier's subject position than the other's essential nature. See generally Edward
W. Said, Orientalism 122 (1979) (arguing that:
IT]he essential aspects of modem Orientalist theory and praxis ... can be
understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient,
but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and
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speaks specifically of colonial discourse, his assessment applies to
other modes of social domination. In Bhabha's analysis, social domi-
nation requires the express differentiation of us from them, or alterna-
tively, self from other. For instance, "whiteness" and "blackness"
emerged as identity concepts through the practice of slavery in the
seventeenth century.75 The very existence of "whiteness" depends
upon the sustained articulation of an "other"-in slavery's case,
"blackness." Put another way, it is only through the marking of an
"other" qua an other that a self's constitution is possible.76 This
scheme suggests not only that notions of self are contingent upon no-
tions of other, but that both conceptual entities are unstable. Positing
"fixity" is thus necessary for sustaining any mode of social domina-
tion. White supremacy, for example, requires ritual insistence that
bodies are definitively intelligible through fixed racial categories. 77
"Fixity" is posited through myriad strategies, rhetorical and
otherwise. Bhabha emphasizes the stereotype's role in the process of
fixing racial meaning.78 The stereotype "vacillates between what is...
already known, and something that must be anxiously re-
peated .... ,,79 It creates a "predictability" that is always "in excess of
re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized,
modernized, and laicized substitutes for... Christian supernaturalism.).
That it is the other who generally gets studied is a fact of enormous consequence. See
Ruth Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters 17-18 (1993) (discussing her study of
whiteness as opposed to traditional studies of other that have left white self unexamined
and unnamed).
75 See Cameron McCarthy, The Uses of Culture 58 (1998) (arguing that notions of
"whiteness" allowed settlers of different ancestry to claim common identity); see also Omi
& Winant, supra note 25, at 62 (arguing that notions of "Europeanness" and "Otherness"
coalesced through violent practices of domination and extermination).
76 See Frankenberg, supra note 74, at 17 ("IT]he Western self is itself produced as an
effect of the Western discursive production of its Others."); Bhabha, supra note 73, at 42
("[Tihe suggestion that colonial power and discourse is possessed entirely by the
coloniser .. is a historical and theoretical simplification .... [T]he intentionality and
unidirectionality of colonial power... also unify the subject of colonial enunciation.").
77 See, e.g., Howard Winant, Racial Dualism at Century's End, in The House that Race
Built 87, 88-91 (Wahneema Lubiano ed., 1998) (describing consolidation of "white versus
other" notion of difference during period of "monolithic white supremacy").
78 See Bhabha, supra note 73, at 46 (discussing black child's disavowal of her race in
self-identification).
79 Id. at 37. The subject behind the stereotype's articulation "turns around the pivot of
the 'stereotype' to return to a point of total identification." Id. at 46. The stereotype's
articulation allows the articulating subject's return to himself. Put another way, it Is
through the stereotype's ritual articulation that the articulating subject is able to stabilize a
"fixed" concept of himself. The stereotype, nevertheless, points to that which simultane-
ously needs no proof, and yet cannot be empirically proven. As such, it is a "process of
ambivalence." Id. at 37. This process threatens the unity of both the stereotype's subject
and object. In Bhabha's words: "The stereotype... for both coloniser and colonised, is
the scene of a similar fantasy and defence-the desire for an originality which is again
threatened by the differences of race, colour and culture." Id. at 45.
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what can be empirically proved."' In the case of Latinas/os, for ex-
ample, there is no empirical evidence suggesting that a significant
number of those who are not fluent in English are averse to learning
it.81 Nonetheless, the idea that Latinas/os are averse to learning Eng-
lish has tremendous currency.82 Similar is the idea that Latinaslos will
not learn English but for the institution of draconian language poli-
cies.8 These stereotypes invite us to consider how language policy
delimits self by marking an other.
Jacques Derrida suggests that one's language is never really one's
own.84 Language does not spring from one's body upon birth. Lan-
guage is always a learned capacity.85 Any organic claim to a language
is necessarily tenuous. Because language is always a learned capacity,
any ordinarily competent person could, theoretically, learn any lan-
guage. Regardless, languages are generally described as the cultural
property of national groups. Languages are routinely claimed in
terms of a national self (i.e., English as America's language). Derrida
suggests that it is only through the systematic imposition of "one's"
language upon an other that one is able to claim that language as
one's own.86 To put it differently, it is only by imposing a language as
"one's own" that it becomes one's own. The modes of imposition in-
clude political rhetoric and schooling.87 Proposition 227 encompasses
both.
so Id. at 37.
81 Empirical evidence suggests that Latinaslos are acquiring English proficiency as
quickly as any other group. See Califa, supra note 50, at 294 (citing studies showing that
"the Hispanic community is acquiring English proficiency as rapidly as other immigrants
have").
82 See Linda Chavez, Out of the Barrio 87 (1991) (referring to animosity stirred by
notions of Latina/o resistance to learning English); Laurie Olsen, Made in America: Immi-
grant Students in Our Public Schools 65 (1997) (contending that many Americans believeimmigrant newcomers are averse to learning English).
83 See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 1, at 73-74 (citing Texas English-only policy that vras
construed as criminalizing speaking Spanish on public-school property).
84 See Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, or, The Prosthesis of Origin 1-6
(Patrick Mensah trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998) (1996).
85 See id. at 40. Language is not only conferred from without, it is, through articulation,
returned to that without. Thus, to call a language one's own in any sort of essential %ay is
an impossibility. See id.
86 Using the metaphor of colonialism, Derrida refers to such an articulation as the "first
trick." Id. at 24. A colonizer cannot assert proprietary rights over the language he speaks.
See supra note 85. It is only through forcing the colonized to believe that the language
belongs to the colonizer that the colonizer can come to believe it himself. "ibs is a "trick"
in that it is the functioning of certain bureaucratic apparatuses-i.e., schools--that produce
the notion of a language that belongs to the colonizer. See id. at 23-24.
87 See id. at 23.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1999] 1419
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
C. Evoking an Un-Raced Subject: What Proposition 227
Does and Does Not Do
Proposition 227 reaffirms English's status as America's public
language88 and thereby marks the other as she who does not know it.
The proposition authorizes a lingual interdiction 89-i.e., the proposi-
tion prohibits the development of native language literacy for students
who cannot call English their own. Non-English instruction is only
available to those for whom the language is foreign.90
Even popular press representations of Proposition 227 suggested
that more was at stake than how best to teach English. Some of these
representations articulated a fear that the Proposition 227 debate
would become racially charged like the Proposition 187 debate four
years earlier.91 These representations, however, did very little to elab-
orate the precise ideological relationship between the two proposi-
tions. Perhaps this should not be surprising given the ideological
relationship's complexity. Although both propositions were directed
at Latina/o and Asian people,92 neither proposition explicitly articu-
lated a racially specific target population. Or did they?
Proposition 187 refers to those who might be "reasonably sus-
pected" of being undocumented, 93 while Proposition 227 refers to
those who need to learn how to speak English.94 The two categories
are often imagined as coextensive. The capacity to speak "unac-
cented," standard English is not race neutral.95 Rather, it positions
88 See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 300(a) ("The English language is the national public
language of the United States of America .... ).
89 Derrida uses the term "interdict" to describe two phenomena. On the one hand, the
term signifies the material practices through which the other is denied access to her native
language. Ironically, however, this very subject's access to the colonial language is also
"interdicted" but in a very different way. Although the other is forced to learn it in school,
she is constantly reminded that it is not her own. See Derrida, supra note 84, at 31.
90 Proposition 227 grants exception to its English-only policy for "children who already
know English." Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 311(a).
91 See, e.g., Frank del Olmo, Take High Road in Bilingual Debate, L.A. Tunes, Feb. 15,
1998, at M5 (writing of desire to spare public anger that could arise if Proposition 227 fight
"gets as ugly as the fight over Proposition 187 did").
92 See Ruben J. Garcia, Comment, Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187, 17 Chi-
cano-Latino L. Rev. 118, 122 (1995) ("Proposition 187 can be viewed as the latest in a long
line of immigration laws which have a racial subtext.").
93 Cal. Educ. Code § 48215(e) (West 1999) (codifying parts of Proposition 187).
94 See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 300(c).
95 That standard English is seen as unaccented is in and of itself suggestive. The per-
ceived neutrality of standard English may parallel the way in which the racial category
"white" is often interpreted as neutral. See Frankenberg, supra note 74, at 199. Similarly,
the appellation "standard" conceals a normative judgment regarding the validity of partic-
ular kinds of English as English.
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some bodies outside the designation "reasonably suspected." 96 Be-
hind Proposition 187's rhetoric rests the concept of someone who is
never "reasonably suspected"; similarly, Proposition 227 reconsoli-
dates the position of someone who need not learn English-for it is
already her language. It would appear that where Proposition 187
sketches a standard of suspicion, Proposition 227 fills it out.
By marking an other as an other, Propositions 227 and 187 ree-
quate "Americanness" with "whiteness." This is not to say that be-
coming a citizen of the United States is still expressly predicated upon
race.97 One's ability to lay claim to an American identity, however, is
racially circumscribed. Consider the phenomena of "hyphenated-
American" identities. 98 In the case of hyphenated identities, the hy-
phen marks an ontological distance from an essential Americanness. 99
However reassuring it may be to claim an American identity, to do so
in a hyphenated capacity is to concede impurity.1 0 The hyphen de-
marcates marginality in a way that allows the (pure) "center" to com-
mand significance without its explicit recognition as center ever
becoming necessary. 01 The penumbra of racial hyphenations around
96 See National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, The Impact of Immigra-
tion Raids on Families, Workers, and Communities 29 (1998) (relating episode in which
Immigration and Naturalization Service agents assumed that Spanish fluency was tanta-
mount to being undocumented).
97 The first naturalization law passed in 1790 restricted naturalization to "white" immi-
grants. See Act of Mar. 26,1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103,103; see also Takaki, supra note 3, at 82,
113,207. It, however, has been somewhat modified in the intervening years. In 1965, Con-
gress abandoned its erstwhile expressly racist immigration quota system. See Immigration
and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L No. 89-236,79 Stat. 911,911 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The current law, however, retains per-country
limits. No country may receive more than seven percent of the total quota of family-spon-
sored and employment-based immigrant visas for any particular year. See Immigration
and Nationality Act § 202(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(2) (1994). The per-country limit trans-
lates into longer waits for applicants from high-immigration countries.
98 See Mary C. Waters, Ethnic Options 158-60 (1990) (discussing extent to which being
Asian and American seem to many to be mutually exclusive).
99 The appellations being conjoined present themselves as mutually exclusive. See id.
100 See, e.g., Takaki, supra note 3, at 212-29 (highlighting experience of second-genera-
tion Japanese immigrants and their desire to identify as "American"). This may not be the
case when a hyphenated identity does not legitimate one's claim of the designation "Amer-
ican." For many white Americans, claiming a hyphenated American identity has more to
do with laying claim to a "culture" than legitimating their status as "American." As such,
claiming a hyphenated identity may be purely volitional. See Waters, supra note 98, at 18-
19. Even when claiming a hyphenated identity is not a volitional matter, the hyphen need
not be seen singularly as a "minus" sign. See Werner Solors, Beyond Etlmicity 243 (1986)
(stating that hyphen is seen as token of avant-garde modernism).
101 See Mike Hill, Trading Races: Majorities, Modernities: A Critique, in Education
and Cultural Studies 139, 143 (Henry A. Giroux & Patrick Shannon eds., 1997) ("[W]hite
subjectivity sustains its normative value by remaining somehow outside the differences it
wants to name .... ).
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Americanness suggests that a notion of whiteness sits at its normative
core.
l0 2
"American" unqualified is generally used to refer to white Amer-
icans.'0 3 In this Note, "whiteness" is used to designate people who
espouse "a set of cultural practices that are usually unmarked and un-
named." 104 Whiteness is the category against which difference is mea-
sured.'05 White Americans often describe themselves as without an
identity or, alternatively, without a culture. 106 By these terms, white
people are positioned as the embodiment of a neutral "sameness"
while people of color are positioned as the embodiment of "differ-
ence."'01 7 These notions of sameness and difference cannot function
without one another. 08 In this dependence relation one can discern
structural similarity to the relationship between "American" and its
hyphenated progeny. Both "white" and "American" function as "nor-
mative ... residual[s]": They are what is left when "difference" is
purged. 0 9 The circularity of this formulation is, at once, obvious and
destabilizing. What might it mean to say that America has always had
a "white core"' if that core's very intelligibility is dependent upon
those thought not to constitute it?"' The core's centrality becomes
unstable because it is radically dependent upon that which is not it.
Creating the fiction of stability (or "fixity") requires persistent restate-
ment of what separates them from us.
Both Propositions 187 and 227 are restatements as such. Proposi-
tion 187 mandated an extensive surveillance regime for the purpose of
102 See Peter Brimelow, Alien Nation 10 (1995) (arguing that America has always had
white core).
103 See Olsen, supra note 82, at 40-41 (noting assumed equivalence between "Ameri-
can" and "white" in common parlance); Takaki, supra note 3, at 6-7 (same); R. Valerie
Lucas, Yellow Peril in the Promised Land, in 1 Europe and Its Others 41, 41 (Francis
Barker et al. eds., 1985) (same).
104 Frankenberg, supra note 74, at 1.
105 See Hill, supra note 101, at 143; George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in White-
ness, 47 Am. Q. 369, 369 (1995) (discussing notions of racial privilege arising from "white-
ness"); Stephen Nathan Haymes, White Culture and the Politics of Racial Difference:
Implications for Multiculturalism, in Multicultural Education, Critical Pedagogy, and the
Politics of Difference 105, 107 (Christine E. Sleeter & Peter L. McLaren eds., 1995) (ex-
ploring "white" culture's "politics of difference").
106 See Frankenberg, supra note 74, at 196 (describing young white women's feelings of
culturelessness); Haymes, supra note 105, at 113 (noting that white people sometimes "ex-
press feelings of culturelessness").
107 See Frankenberg, supra note 74, at 197.
108 See generally Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imag-
ination (1992) (exploring manifestations of black others in American literature),
109 Frankenberg, supra note 74, at 198.
110 See Brimelow, supra note 102, at 10 ("[T]he American nation has always had a spe-
cific ethnic core. And that core has been white.").
111 See McCarthy, supra note 75, at 111-13.
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identifying and excluding those deemed not to belong' 12 It is non-
white immigrants who are accused of bringing about a "massive...
transformation" in America's political and cultural texture.113 Pre-
sumably, the characteristics that account for the "massive transforma-
tion" also would have rendered nonwhite immigrants "reasonably
suspect." Proposition 187's sponsors did, after all, name their organi-
zation "Save Our State" (SOS).114 Had Proposition 187 gone into ef-
fect, its "reasonably suspected" designation would have compromised
Asian- and Latin-looking or -sounding'15 peoples' status as "Ameri-
can." Through its designation, Proposition 187 implicitly reconsoli-
dated the identity of a person whose Americanness is beyond
question.
Proposition 227 also consolidates racial meaning, albeit in a more
subtle way than Proposition 187. Ostensibly, Proposition 227 is predi-
cated upon a neutral assertion: English fluency allows for upward mo-
bility.116 By articulating this assertion, Proposition 227 can rationalize
the "immersion" program it prescribes by claiming to speak for poor,
primarily Spanish-speaking people of color.1 17 They, after all, should
be "eager" for their children to learn English.118 English unquestiona-
bly enjoys national hegemony. English's hegemony, however, is not a
neutral fact. Rather, it is a fact saturated with histories of violence.119
112 The Proposition's purpose was to "establish a system of required notification by and
between [state] agencies to prevent illegal aliens in the United States from receiving bene-
fits or public services." See Prop. 187, supra note 51, § 1. With regard to schools, Proposi-
tion 187 created affirmative obligations for schools to identify, report, and exclude anyone
not legally in the United States. See id. § 7.
113 Brimelow, supra note 102, at 10 ("iMihe massive ethnic and racial transformation
that public policy is now inflicting on America is totally new ....
114 See Garcia, supra note 92, at 118.
115 Language not only marks those vho might have been thought "reasonably" suspect,
it has historically featured as an exclusionary criterion in American naturalization policy.
See Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 8, 34 Stat. 596, 599 (1906) (denying citizenship
to non-English-speaking immigrants); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust, 77 Minn.
L. Rev. 269, 332-33 (1992) (discussing effect of English literacy requirements of immigra-
tion and naturalization laws (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(b)(1)(D)(i), 1423 (1994))).
116 See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 300(b) (finding that English enables participation "in
the American Dream of economic and social advancement"). But see Fishman, supra note
67, at 131 (suggesting that English fluency may be almost as inoperative for Hispanics'
social mobility as it is for Blacks').
117 See supra note 55.
118 See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 300(b).
119 See Perea, supra note 115, at 315 ("We must recognize ... the coercion ... inherent
in the dominance of English as the language of most Americans."). America's language
policy toward native peoples is also suggestive. Until the late nineteenth century, native-
and mission-run schools educated Native American children. Many of those schools %vere
bilingual. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, created in the late 19th century, closed all such
schools. The Bureau was charged with the responsibility of creating school environments
that would induce Native American children to turn away from their native languages. To
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Even if we were willing to overlook these histories, Proposition 227's
failure to deliver the English fluency whose importance it so righ-
teously proclaims must warrant skepticism. 120 Because it fails on its
own terms, it is easier to argue that Proposition 227 functions primar-
ily at a rhetorical level as racist exhortation.
Proposition 227 emphasizes the importance of forcing immigrant
children to learn English without providing a mechanism to achieve
that end. Opponents have denounced Proposition 227's educational
scheme as terribly inadequate. 121 The one-year sheltered immersion,
which is to precede students' transfer into English-only classrooms,
will not equip children with sufficient English fluency to succeed in
English-medium classrooms. 122 Successfully functioning in an Eng-
lish-only academic environment requires more than just rudimentary
familiarity with English.123
Studies reveal children do not necessarily "pick up" English more
quickly if "immersed" in it.124 It may take five or six years for chil-
achieve this end, the Bureau created "boarding schools" that were located away from na-
tive children's tribal homes. It was thought that removing children from their cultural con-
text would speed English acculturation. At the boarding schools, children were organized
into mixed language groups to ensure that the children would have to rely upon English.
The schools' policy prohibited native speech, and violators were punished severely. See
Shirley Silver & Wick R. Miller, American Indian Languages: Cultural and Social Con-
texts 11 (1997).
120 See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 300(c) ("California [has] a moral obligation and a
constitutional duty to provide all of California's children, regardless of their ethnicity or
national origins, with .. literacy in the English language .... ).
121 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary In-
junction at 11, Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (No. C 98-2252
CAL). The irony, of course, is that Proposition 227 reinstitutes what has always been the
de facto, if not official, language policy in most California schools. The vast majority of
California's public schools never created bilingual programs. As a result, 70% of Califor-
nia's non-English-speaking students went without any sort of special language program.
See supra notes 15, 17 and accompanying text. For those districts that instituted transi-
tional bilingual programs, many functioned as little more than English-only programs. See
supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. I am assuming that there is a
profound difference between "getting by" and "succeeding." By its own terms, Proposition
227 only requires that children have a "good working knowledge" of English prior to being
transferred into mainstream, English-only classrooms. See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 305;
see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
123 Cf. Henry T. Trueba, Raising Silent Voices 30 (1989) (noting that consistent "English
as a second language" instruction fails to equip pupils with enough English to function in
English-speaking classrooms). Proposition 227's vision of sheltered immersion is not only
very short, it encourages the mixing of students who are of different ages and language
backgrounds. See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 305.
124 Of the few studies of bilingual education, one of the more recent and sophisticated
was prepared for the U.S. Department of Education. The eight-year longitudinal study
sought to compare the relative effectiveness of immersion, early-exit, and late-exit TBE
programs. Among the study's stated implications are that non-English-speaking students
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dren who do not speak English to become proficient in English to the
extent necessary to succeed in English-medium classes. 12s
Throughout the Proposition 227 campaign, it was no secret that
the proposition was addressed to Latina/o and Asian communities.
They constitute the vast majority of California's non-English-speaking
students.126 It is telling that Proposition 227 implies that all non-Eng-
lish-speaking children are "immigrants."' ' 7 Proposition 227's assump-
tion is that if one does not speak English one is not American. Many
non-English-speaking children, however, were born in the United
States.'m
Regardless, Proposition 227 designates all non-English-speaking
students "English learners."'129 It bears repeating that Proposition 227
reaffirms English as America's "public language" and the "leading
world language."13 Latina/o and Asian children are marked as other
in a vast, sweeping gesture that enunciates their common deficiency:
not having English.131
The designation "English learner" should at once seem odd.
Everyone must learn English in order to speak and use it.02 Never-
theless, Proposition 227 uses the designation "English learner" to re-
fer only to non-English-speaking schoolchildren. 133 Through its
assignation of "English learner" status, the proposition consolidates
the identity of a subject who is not an "English learner" because
may require prolonged assistance if they are to succeed in English-only classes. See
Ramirez et al., supra note 62, at 40; see also Nunberg, supra note 40, at 44 ("[Compared
with various types of 'immersion' programs, bilingual education reduces the time to reach
full English fluency by between two and three years.").
W Seven years is the approximate length of most late-exit programs. See Ramirez et
al., supra note 62, at 2.
126 See supra note 17.
127 The proposition claims that California schools do a poor job educating immigrant
children. See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 300(d).
12 A 1993 study for the U.S. Department of Education found that 41%4a of elementary-
school students with low English proficiency were born in the United States. See Howard
L. Fleischman & Paul J. Hopstock, 1 Descriptive Study of Services to Limited English
Proficient Students 6 (1993).
129 Prop. 227, supra note 6, §§ 305, 306(a).
130 Id. § 300(a).
131 Proposition 227 defines an "English learner" in terms of deficiency. -'English
learner' means a child who does not speak English... and who is not currently able to
perform ordinary classroom work in English, also known as a Limited English Proficiency
or LEP child." Id. § 306(a).
M32 This, of course, holds true for every language. Language is always a learned capacity;,
learning a language necessarily entails an imposition from without one's self. Articulating
proprietary rights over a language is, therefore, very peculiar. Derrida reflects on such in
asserting that language always comes from and is returned (through speech, presumably)
to a place that is outside one's self. See Derrida, supra note 84, at 40.
133 Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 306(a). Ninety-eight percent of pupils so classified are
people of color. See Olsen et al., supra note 66, at 214.
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America's public language is already his own. He speaks English not
because he has learned it, but because it belongs to him: It is his
birthright. 34
Proposition 227's unnamed linguistic claimant is necessarily
white.135 For the white American, Spanish (Chinese, Khmer, etc.) is
always a foreign language. Proposition 227 consolidates this under-
standing by, implicitly, constructing native Spanish (Chinese, Khmer,
etc.) fluency as a problem in desperate need of eradication. The Prop-
osition requires public schools to abandon any commitment to foster-
ing literacy in non-English, native languages. It effectively provides
that non-English languages can only be taught as foreign languages.13 6
In so doing, Proposition 227 gives rise to a strange paradox: A non-
English student can only begin to learn her native language in school
when it is clear that she has forgotten it.
II
A LARGER CoNTEXrT
Proposition 227's evocation of racial meaning cannot be fully ap-
preciated without reference to the broader contradictions that inhere
in American national identity. Throughout the 20th century, educa-
tion and language policy have featured centrally in efforts to shore up
Americanness. Part II will consider these dynamics in relation to
Proposition 227.
A. A Nation Whose Bounds Lie in Its Boundlessness
Proposition 227's participation in the consolidation of racial
meaning is not unique. It is entirely continuous with an assimilation
ethic that embraces school as the site of "de-ethnization.' 31 7 "De-
ethnization's" upshot is, presumably, a subject without race or ethnic-
134 Derrida would call this a "trick." See supra note 86.
135 The identity of Proposition 227's (implicit) English non-learner is complicated by
America's sizable black population. Ostensibly, most black Americans are English speak-
ers. "Black English," however, is stigmatized as impure-a deviant English that, under
ideal conditions, would be absorbed back into standard English. See Henry Louis Gates,
Jr., The Signifying Monkey xix (1988) (noting predictions that Black English would disap-
pear with integration). The demonization of non-English primary fluency and Black Eng-
lish may be coterminous. The Ebonics controversy in California suggested as much. See,
e.g., Editorial, Mainstream English is the Key: Official Status for Black English Won't
Cure Educational Problems, L.A. Times, Dec. 22, 1996, at M4.
136 See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 311(a) (making waivers to English-only requirement
available to "[c]hildren who already know English").
137 See Joshua A. Fishman, Language Loyalty in the United States 21 (1966) (discussing
social scientists' fascination with assimilation or "disappearance phenomena" rather than
"maintenance phenomena").
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ity.138 As such, "de-ethnization," of which learning standardized Eng-
lish is an important aspect, has been central to notions of American
national identity. 39 "De-ethnization's" emphasis on "neutralizing"
subjects normalizes the equation between essential Americanness and
whiteness.140
Nations are conceptually reliant upon some notion of "us. '141
More precisely, "nation" marks an exclusionary community that is
rhetorically organized around some specified us.142 Calling oneself a
member of a national community always entails more than simply
identifying with a spatial abstraction. The way in which national
"space" is delimited and invested with significance depends upon the
articulation of an "us., 143 Calling oneself "American," for instance,
requires identifying with specified concepts of Americanness that are
not merely the effect of existing within America's territorial bounda-
ries.144 Rather, notions of Americanness lend particularized signifi-
cance to one's existence within America's territorial boundaries.
It is ironic that "national concepts" often consolidate their legiti-
macy by positing the nation as "the exemplar of universal quali-
ties. '1 45 American nationalist rhetoric relentlessly translates
"America" into one of many pithy universalisms: America is the land
of liberty, freedom, opportunity, etc. It is often stated that because
American is an idea, being American requires little more than vigor-
138 See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
139 See Fishman, supra note 137, at 21.
140 See Frankenberg, supra note 74, at 196.
141 See Nirmala Srirekam PuruShotam, Negotiating Language, Constructing Race 5
(1997) (arguing that nation is form of social knowledge). Studies of nationalism have
sought to substantiate the claim that a shared culture engenders nationalism. See, e.&,
Ernest Gellner, Nationalism 4 (1997). Such accounts, however, may ignore the extent to
which cultural "pasts" are invented ex post for the nation. See, e.g., Eric Hobsbawm, In-
troduction: Inventing Traditions, in The Invention of Tradition 1, 1 (Eric Hobsbawm &
Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
142 See Joan Copjec, The Phenomenal Nonphenomenal: Private Space in Film Noir, in
Shades of Noir 167,174 (Joan Copjec ed., 1993) (asking what "allos the nation to collect a
vast array of people, discount all their positive differences, and count them as citizens, as
members of the same set, in logical terms as identical[ ]"); Klaus Schleicher, Introduction
to Nationalism in Education 13, 21 (Klaus Schleicher ed., 1993) (asserting that nation's
social meaning is predicated upon separation from other countries).
143 See Doreen Massey, Double Articulation, in Displacements 110, 114 (Angelika
Bammer ed., 1994) (arguing that national "characterizations of place are all attempts to ...
give [them] single, fixed identities and to define them as bounded .... characterized by
their own internal history, and through their differentiation from [the] 'outside.'").
144 See Copjec, supra note 142, at 174.
145 Peter Fitzpatrick, 'We Know What It Is When You Do Not Ask Us,' in Nationalism,
Racism and the Rule of Law 3, 9-10 (Peter Fitzpatrick ed., 1995) (arguing that nation's
conceptual legitimacy may depend upon rhetorical self-effacement through which national
community is styled as not nationalistic).
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ous commitment to that idea.146 However seductive, this brand of
universalism leaves "America" teetering on absurdity's brink.
America as an idea leaves open the possibility of an America without
physical limits.147
The national identity contradiction demands the construction of
an oppositional universality.148 That is to say, the nation must repre-
sent itself as universal in opposition to what is outside its universal-
ity.149 The nation requires an other; that other takes the form of she
who does not embody the nation's universal qualities or aspirations. 150
In America's case, the other is conceived as she who is unable to take
advantage of American liberty and opportunity on account of indo-
lence, inability to speak English, etc.' 51 In her most alarming manifes-
tation, the nation's other threatens the very unity upon which the
nation's universal qualities depend.152 America simply cannot
continue being the land of opportunity if people radically dissimilar
from us are permitted to call it their home. 53 Assimilation and exclu-
sion thus present themselves as linked strategies for managing
otherness.
The assimilable other can be re-formed into a likeness of the con-
ceptual us while the unassimilable other simply cannot. 154 Exclusion
146 "America is an idea as much as it is a country. [It] has ... everything to do with
allegiance to a set of principles." Henry Grunwald, Home Is Where You Are Happy, Time,
July 8, 1985, at 100-01. Grunwald's piece reflects American universalism and the contra-
dictions that inhere therein.
147 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 145, at 10; Copjec, supra note 142, at 175 (describing how
enumeration of citizens could continue ad infinitum without geographic limits). We know
that America has very definite limits. Not every kind of person can become an American.
In most cases, one needs to have been a lawful permanent resident for five years before
one can naturalize. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1994). In order to become a lawful permanent
resident, one has to be admitted to the United States. Admission criteria include health,
political ideology, and class, among others. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1), (3)(D), (4) (1994).
148 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 145, at 22.
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the
American Working Class 13-15 (1991).
152 One sees the traces of this sensibility in the gloom and doom suggestions that ram-
pant immigration threatens to overwhelm the United States. See Brimelow, supra note
102, at xv.
153 See id. at 7 (arguing that unassimilable immigrants may threaten American ideal
figuratively and white Americans literally).
154 See id. at 9 (trying to show that new immigrants are radically different from
America's majority). One sees the traces of a similar sensibility in Justice Harlan's famous
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Harlan articulated the link between
America's exclusionary citizenship laws and the intractable otherness of Chinese immi-
grants. See id. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("There is a race so different from our own
that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Per-
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becomes a strategy for dealing with those who are not assimilable. 155
Both exclusion and assimilation type the other vis-A-vis the national
"we." The national we, in turn, depends upon these processes for its
integrity and stability.
The image of an "ideal American" suggests how the national we
is imagined. The idealized blond-haired, blue-eyed American
presents more than just a physical emblem of essential Americanness.
She connotes a way of being that encompasses language, tastes, sexual
orientation, and more.156 One's physical similarity to the ideal has,
historically, determined the capacity in which one is allowed to partici-
pate in American society (to the extent one is permitted to participate
at all). 7 New Mexico, for instance, was denied statehood in 1902 for
failing to be sufficiently Anglo.18
None of this is to say that America's putative "white core" is sta-
ble. What it means to be white is in constant flux just as is any other
racial category.' 59 With each successive round of assimilation and/or
exclusion, white Americanness emerges a bit different from what it
was before. 60 Managing the white core's tenuousness has presented
constant challenge. Its persistent instability is revealed through the
core's self-articulated relationship with the other.161 Efforts at manag-
sons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I
allude to the Chinese race.").
155 Restrictive immigration policies are often rationalized in terms of how different the
people being excluded are. See Takaki, supra note 3, at 201.
156 See generally Ann duCille, The Shirley Temple of My Familiar, Transition, Issue 73,
at 10 (1998) (discussing idealization of Shirley Temple).
1-57 For a powerful representation of this point, see Toni Morrison, The Bluest Eye
(1970).
158 In 1902, a congressional delegation visited New Mexico in order to investigate the
possibility of statehood. In rationalizing its recommendation against statehood, the con-
gressional committee reported:
[W]hen the mass of the people... shall, in the usages and employment of their
daily life, have become identical in language and customs with the great body
of the American people; when the immigration of English speaking people...
does its modifying work with the "Mexican" element-when all these things
have come to pass, the committee hopes and believes that this mass of people,
unlike us in race, language, and social customs, will finally come to form a
creditable portion of American citizenship.
S. Rep. No. 57-2206, at 9 (1902); see also Crawford, supra note 1, at 52; Perea, supra note
115, at 320-23.
159 See Omi & Wmant, supra note 25, at 54-55; see also Stuart Hall, Cultural Identity
and Diaspora, in Contemporary Postcolonial Theory, supra note 73, at 110, 110 ("[W]e
should think... of identity as a 'production', which is never complete .... ").
160 See Noel Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White 69 (1995) (arguing that expanding
"whiteness" to include Irish was needed by whites to justify perpetuation of slavery).
161 A YMCA motto from the early twentieth century spoke in reference to new immi-
grants: "Unless we Americanize them they will foreignize us." See Carlson, supra note 24,
at 86.
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ing the other were necessarily informed by a desire for self-
consolidation.
Proposition 227 is another chapter in a nationalistic narrative that
seeks to stabilize America's putative "we." The proposition rearticu-
lates aggressive "de-ethnization" as a strategy for managing otherness.
Moreover, Proposition 227 rearticulates American specificity (e.g.,
English-only) as the predicate for American universalism (e.g., "land
of liberty and opportunity"): You've got to learn English if you're
going to "make it" in America. Proposition 227 not only reproduces
America's white "us," it reemphasizes the extent to which school is
the site for that reproduction. As this Note discusses in the following
section, public schools have been among the primary sites for Ameri-
can de-ethnization.
B. Making Americans in Our Own Image
School is not a space in which already constituted subjects pas-
sively ingest information. 162 The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education163 rightly saw that an important role of schools is to make
citizens out of children. 164 There is, however, another idea at play in
Brown and a number of cases that follow it-an understanding that
school preserves (through reproduction) our values.1 65 This under-
standing might cast light on why schools appear at the center of
American language politics.' 66 What is thought to be "at stake" is
sometimes seen in terms as grand as our "national unity. ' 167
162 See Michael W. Apple, Cultural Politics & Education 64 (1996) (discussing forma-
tion of conservative groups interested in affecting what counts as "official knowledge" in
public schools); see also Henry A. Giroux, Ideology, Culture, and the Process of Schooling
22 (1981) (arguing that schools are sites where ideologies are sustained, produced, and
rejected).
163 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
164 See id. at 493 ("Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our demo-
cratic society.... It is the very foundation of good citizenship.").
165 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,76 (1979) (acknowledging "[t]he importance of
public schools .. in the preservation of the values on which our society rests"); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973) (agreeing that education
"is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values" (quoting Brown, 347
U.S. at 493)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (same).
166 Michael Apple, for instance, writes about how issues of traditionalism, the transmis-
sion of values, and personal security animate discussions of dropout rates, illiteracy, and
curricular inadequacy. See Apple, supra note 162, at 6-7.
167 Many proponents of English-only statutes have insisted that America's national
unity hinges upon a shared fluency in English. See Crawford, supra note 1, at 24 (listing
arguments made by others). Many such proponents have held Canada out as an example
of what might happen if America endorsed bilingualism. See Norman Shumway, Preserve
the Primacy of English, in Language Loyalties 121, 122 (James Crawford ed., 1992). The
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While it is plausible that there is some connection between a
shared set of values and national unity,168 it does not logically follow
that the nation need be homogeneous. Nonetheless, the suggestion
that learning in a foreign language is inimical to the inculcation of
"American values" has been forcefully made throughout America's
recent history.169 It is telling that in educational policy debates, the
question of language instruction drowns out virtually every other sig-
nificant educational issue involving non-English-speaking children. 170
This obsession, like all others, has a history.
Americanization refers generally to processes of de-ethnization
and, specifically, to an assimilation movement that has its roots in the
eighteenth century, but peaked in the early twentieth century. 171 De-
spite the fact that it is no longer a formal movement, Americaniza-
tion's central concerns continue to govern how educational objectives
are conceived for non-English-speaking children. Initially, American-
ization's principal agents were young, Protestant college graduates.
They sought to tap new immigrants' "democratic potential." 172 Amer-
icanizers often received state and local support.'73 Reformers sub-
scribed to dominant ideas regarding the "tenaciousness" of
immigrants' foreign characteristics. 174 In response to immigrants'
rigid foreignness, Americanizers sought to enact intensive programs of
"social remediation."' 75
Ninth Circuit, in Guadalupe Organization Inc. v. Tempe Elementary School District, 587
F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978), suggested that English-only educational programs preserve na-
tional unity, which is a legitimate state interest. See id. at 1027.
168 "National unity" tends to take the conceptual form of a unitary "we." The American
we's reliance upon universalistic abstraction is evidenced by the hegemonic claim that "we
are all immigrants." It is a claim that is ritually intoned in many public schools. The ho-
mogenizing rhetoric of being an "immigrant nation," however, erases the differential con-
ditions of arrival and the myriad ways in which race circumscribes participation in
American society. See Apple, supra note 162, at 15-17.
169 Raymond Tatalovich, for instance, notes the notional role played by "un-American
values" in the lower court's decision in Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100 (Neb. 1922), rev'd sub
nom. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See Raymond Tatalovich, Nativism Reborn
58 (1995).
170 See Olsen, supra note 82, at 91; Garcfa & Otheguy, supra note 43, at 99.
171 See Carlson, supra note 24, at 1-5.
172 See id. at 60-61.
173 In Los Angeles, for example, a municipal law was enacted allowing Americanizers to
pursue their program within the homes of Americanization's immigrant beneficiaries. See
George J. Sanchez, Becoming Mexican American 98-99 (1993).
174 See Paula S. Fass, Outside In 23 (1989) (describing how Americanizers highlighted
ethnic differences in effort to eradicate them).
175 Schools were to become the "agents of culture [and] connect the democratic poten-
tial of an enormously diverse population to the unities of an ancient citizenship .... " Id. at
34. This idea may not seem especially surprising now. However, until the early twventieth
century, schools were not conceived of as systematically serving a socialization function.
See id.
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Americanizers initially designated the workplace as the primary
site of their activity. 176 Rather quickly, they shifted their focus to
schools on account of schools' broad socializing potential.177 Schools
offered the potential of saving immigrant children from their own
pathological cultures.178 Schools serve a socializing function regard-
less of whether intended or not.179 Americanizers, however, not only
articulated socialization as an educational objective, but urged that it
should take the form of making "Americans" of the new immi-
grants.180 Lingual interdiction was an important strategy in the effort.
Until the late 1960s, linguistic interdiction was rationalized by the
association of bilingualism with intellectual inferiority.181 At the very
least, it was thought that bilingualism produced confusion.182 Through
such understandings, an educational policy geared towards producing
monoglot English speakers was made to seem as if it were in the best
interests of immigrants, not to mention national unity.
Teaching English was one of Americanization's core ambitions. 183
To this day, as the Proposition 227 debate evidences, language instruc-
tion is the most salient policy question pertaining to immigrant educa-
tion.184 In its various incarnations, however, Americanization has
insisted on something more than just English fluency. It has de-
manded English above all others. The exhortation to "learn English"
linked the affirmative act of learning a new language with the negative
176 See id. at 23-25.
177 See id. at 24 ("The school was the only institution that could hope to alter immigrant
culture where it was environmentally most permeable-the care and instruction of
children.").
178 See id. at 25 (noting that only schools could "save the child from the life he was
destined otherwise to lead").
179 See Carlson & Apple, supra note 3, at 198 (criticizing traditional notion that educa-
tion entails merely passive communication of information).
180 See Fass, supra note 174, at 26 ("[Reformers] hoped the schools would replace objec-
tionable forms of living and prepare the young to live better (and more American) lives
than they would have lived without schooling.").
181 See Hakuta, supra note 68, at 10 (noting socially assumed connection between bilin-
gualism and inferiority); Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, Multilingualism and the Education of Mi-
nority Children, in Policy and Practice in Bilingual Education, supra note 43, at 40, 42
(same). In certain circles, the repudiation of the bilingualism-inferiority link has not yet
registered. President Ronald Reagan was quick to note that bilingual education is
designed to preserve native-language fluency, which retards English acquisition. See James
T. Lyons, The Past and Future Directions of Federal Bilingual-Education Policy, in Policy
and Practice in Bilingual Education, supra note 43, at 1, 6.
182 See Hakuta, supra note 68, at 28.
183 See Sanchez, supra note 173, at 100 ("The most potent weapon used to imbue the
foreigner with American values was the English language.").
184 See supra text accompanying note 170.
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act of forgetting an "other" language. 18s Such linkage is logically con-
tinuous with the Americanization movement's demand that immi-
grants be purged of any "foreignisms." 186 In 1918, for instance, Texas
instituted criminal penalties against teachers caught speaking any non-
English language in class.187 Meyer v. Nebraska18s overturned a simi-
lar law in Nebraska. Sanctions against teachers, however, only begin
to suggest the dimensions of Americanization's lingual interdiction.
Americanization's edict that immigrants must learn English pre-
cipitated the intensification of an academic surveillance that impli-
cated both students and teachers. 8 9 In schools with Spanish-speaking
students, for instance, teachers would often put up signs exhorting stu-
dents to "speak in English" or, alternatively, not to speak in Span-
ish.190 These and other rhetorical strategies implicitly, if not explicitly,
served to rearticulate the essential connection between being Ameri-
can and speaking English.191 Speaking Spanish in school invited ver-
bal and physical reprimand by students and teachers. 192 Both were
agents of the lingual prohibition's enforcement. 193
The lingual prohibition's violence betrays the agents' insecurity.
At stake was not just the other's capacity to speak English, but the
185 "Both the fact and the expectation of de-ethnization have affected language mainte-
nance in the United States .... " Fishman, supra note 137, at 29. School is, of course,
integral to the process of de-ethnization.
186 See Carlson, supra note 24, at 5 (explaining that factories, YMCAs, and community
organizations established classes to instruct immigrants in English, citizenship, and Ameri-
can customs).
187 See Crawford, supra note 1, at 72.
188 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
189 Surveillance does not refer to a neutral practice of watching. Rather, it refers to an
apparatus of power through which knowledge is assembled. Power perpetually creates
knowledge which, in turn, induces effects of power. See Michel Foucault, PoweriKnowl-
edge 52 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., The Harvester Press 19S0) (1972).
Surveillance does not emanate from a point; rather, it is "[ain inspecting gaze, a gaze which
each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own
overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself." Id. at
155. It is not by sociological accident that most students become increasingly disinterested
in speaking their "mother tongue" as they proceed through American schools. See
Fishman, supra note 137, at 123.
190 See Carlson, supra note 24, at 116-17 (reporting Mexican American student's recol-
lection that "SPEAK ENGLISH" signs at his school pointed out to him that he was "not
acceptable").
191 James Crawford relates a story from the 1940s of a Texas high school that, its 99%
Mexican enrollment notwithstanding, had an English-only policy. Students were given rib-
bons reading, "I Am an American-I Speak English." Students were encouraged to report
each other for violating the sacred equation. Violators also faced corporal punishment.
See Crawford, supra note 1, at 79.
192 See id. at 79-80; Kevin Baxter, Finding His Roots-and a Powerful Voice, L.A.
Tunes, Apr. 19,1996, at El (noting author Victor Vlaseilor's memories of his English-only
education).
193 See supra notes 191-92.
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agent's capacity to call himself a "real American." The Ameri-
canizers' objectives were not simply to teach English or American his-
tory, but rather to "reform" immigrants through the imposition of an
idealized notion of Americanness-one saturated by an Anglo-
Protestant sensibility. 194 Americanization necessarily demanded inva-
sive operating procedures. 195 In Los Angeles, for instance, middle-
class Anglo women were Americanization's chief agents. Pursuant to
the Home Teacher Act, white American women were permitted to
work in their pupils' homes. 196 The "teacher's" purpose was not only
to teach children English, but to instruct their parents in the way of
"proper" diet, sanitation, etc.' 97 In the case of Mexican immigrants in
Southern California, instilling a proper work ethic was an important
objective as well. 98
One should not exaggerate the extent to which Americanization
really sought to make Americans of Mexican immigrants in Califor-
nia. Those whom it targeted were presented with an image of Ameri-
canness so idealized as to be inimitable.1 99 Americanization's point in
Southern California was, perhaps, less to Americanize and more to
consolidate a particularized way of being by holding it out as worth
imitating. By the 1930s the Great Depression's onset had brought
Americanization to a halt. Assimilation efforts gave way to exclusion
efforts.200 Mexicans were repatriated; during the 1930s, 500,000 Mexi-
194 Americanization reflected a mode of reconciling a perceived Protestant history with
mass influxes of non-Protestant immigrants. See Carlson, supra note 24, at 1-12. We must
also recall the import of any violent cultural imposition. Impositions are not just exhorta-
tions; they consolidate the status of that which is imposed. See discussion of Derrida supra
Part I.B.
195 Americanizers' attention was trained upon language, eating and bathing habits, fam-
ily dynamics, children's games, etc. See Fass, supra note 174, at 24-25.
196 See Sanchez, supra note 173, at 99.
197 See id. at 102-03.
198 See id. at 104. Americanizers saw Mexicans, although "lazy," as more "adaptable"
than Asians. See id. at 95. Asians manifested otherness in a capacity so extreme that
exclusion was thought the only strategy for dealing with them. See id.; Takaki, supra note
3, at 199-201. That Mexicans were thought amenable to Americanization was certainly a
function of California's racial texture during the 1910s and 1920s. In other parts of the
country, Americanization was primarily directed at southern and eastern Europeans. Mex-
icans constituted a substantial portion of California's population. Many migrated to Cali-
fornia after 1910. See Mike Davis, City of Quartz 114 (1992). The early twentieth century
also witnessed the dramatic influx of middle-class, Midwestern Protestants. See id. Many
of these immigrants had been lured to California by aggressive advertising campaigns that
pitched Southern California as a safe space for the white race's preservation. See id. at 30.
199 See Sanchez, supra note 173, at 105 (explaining that Americanization programs of-
fered unattainable, idealized versions of American values).
200 See id. at 106.
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cans left the United States.201 Notwithstanding its formal demise,
Americanization permanently affected how public education is con-
ceived. In a sense, "Americanization" persists as an objective that no
longer requires a movement.
C. Making Americans, Not Bilinguals
As first conceived in the 1960s, bilingual education sought to pro-
duce students who were literate and fluent in two languages.202 As
such, bilingual education was not for the exclusive benefit of non-
English-speaking students. Rather, it was supposed to allow native
English and non-English speakers to learn from one another. Where
implemented, many such programs have been successful.20 3 Although
mandated by California's bilingual education law,-' such programs
were far from the norm.M5
Most bilingual education programs are not designed to produce
bilinguals. 2 6 It is no surprise, given that both the Bilingual Education
Act (BEA)20 7 and California's state bilingual law embrace a "deficit
theory" of non-English fluency.203 The BEA and California's state
201 See id. Although they technically left the United States by choice, the government
put intense pressure upon Mexicans in California to return to Mexico. See id. at 209-12.
California, for instance, prohibited the employment of "aliens" on public works in 1931.
See id. at 211.
22 See Hakuta, supra note 68, at 194.
2M See supra note 45.
204 Such programs were authorized under the designation "bilingual-bicultural educa-
tion." In popular discourse, these programs were referred to as "dual immersion." The
stated purpose of such programs was to "enable the pupil to achieve competency" in both
English and her "primary language." Cal. Educ. Code § 52163(a)(2), (b) (West 1989).
2M There were only about 100 dual immersion programs in California as of Proposition
227's passage. See Liz Seymour, Fighting for Dual Immersion Education, LA. Times (Or-
ange County Edition), June 23, 1998, at Bi, available in 1998 WL 2439760.
206 See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Code § 52163(a)(2) (West 1989) (stating that instruction in "pri-
mary language" will continue until "transfer" to English is made); David Spener, Transi-
tional Bilingual Education and the Socialization of Immigrants, 58 Harv. Educ. Rev. 133,
147 (1988) (explaining that goal of federally funded TBE has never been "production" of
bilingual adults).
20 The BEA was passed in 1968. Pub. L No. 90-247,81 Stat. 816 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). The BEA is part of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783, and was an exten-
sion of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L No. 89-10,79 Stat.
27. In its current incarnation, the BEA emphasizes developing English skills, but makes
some allowance for the development of native language skills. See 20 U.S.C. § 7402(c)(3)
(1994). The BEA is designed to provide states with funding for bilingual education pro-
grams. It does not create any sort of affirmative legal obligation that states must provide
special services to non-English-speaking children. See id. §§ 7402-7403 (1994).
203 See John J. Attinasi, Racism, Language Variety, and Urban U.S. Minorities: Issues
in Bilingualism and Bidialectalism, in Race 319,319 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds.,
1994) (arguing that terms such as "non-English proficient" perpetuate "deficit theory re-
garding cultural diversity").
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law speak of "children of limited English proficiency" (LEP).20 9 Flu-
ency in a non-English language is coded negatively, as a defect.210
Constructing Spanish-speaking children as LEPs frames a limited pol-
icy response. The BEA's primary purpose is to provide financial sup-
port for transitional bilingual programs, not programs that develop
literacy in two languages.21' Spanish language instruction is intended
to ensure that children do not lose academic ground in non-language-
related subjects while they are learning English.212 Once transition is
completed, Spanish language instruction ceases.
The BEA, as amended in 1974, refused federal support to all
dual-immersion-type schemes.213 One should not, however, overlook
how dramatic the BEA's initial passage was. Although it reiterated a
"de-ethnization" ethic, 214 the BEA conceded to Spanish a status pre-
viously denied. In pushing for the BEA's passage, activists and legis-
lators were, in large part, responding to the criminalization of Spanish
in public schools.215
In the discussion above, I refer exclusively to Spanish rather than
non-English languages. Although the BEA does not refer exclusively
to Spanish, its sponsor, Senator Ralph Yarborough, thought that the
BEA's benefits should accrue to Hispanics alone.216 Yarborough's
proposal was, avowedly, in response to high Hispanic dropout rates in
the Southwest.21 7 By his logic, Hispanics deserved concessions be-
cause, while other immigrants chose to immigrate, the United States
209 See 20 U.S.C § 7402(a)(5) (1994) ("[L]imited English proficient children ... face a
number of challenges in receiving an education that will enable [them] to participate fully
in American society...."); see also Reynaldo F. Macfas, Language and Ethnic Classifica-
tion of Language Minorities: Chicano and Latino Students in the 1990s, 15 Hispanic J.
Behav. Sci. 230, 235-36 (1993) (contending that LEP may be used as ersatz ethnic
category).
210 See Attinasi, supra note 208, at 319 (stating that "[tierms such as... non-English
proficient perpetuate a deficit theory regarding cultural diversity.").
211 See Lyons, supra note 181, at 2.
212 See id.
213 See id. But see supra note 207 (describing how BEA in current form makes some
allowance for development of native language skills).
214 See Fishman, supra note 137, at 21.
215 See Crawford, supra note 1, at 81.
216 See Diane Ravitch, The Troubled Crusade 271 (1983) (discussing debate surrounding
BEA).
217 Emphasizing the co-occurrence of language and minority "failure" may obfuscate
the extent to which institutional racism produces certain educational outcomes. See
Macias, supra note 209, at 235 (noting that proficiency in non-English language may qualify
students for civil rights law protection). The BEA's reliance on LEP as an organizing
principle compounds the obfuscation by decoupling language from race. This is a serious
problem given that certain ideas of race govern discussions of language (in the bilingual
education context). See id. at 231.
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conquered the Southwest.218 Yarborough's model of Americanness
was unwavering; it was merely a question of how intensively the state
should exhort immigrants to imitate the model. Ultimately, TBE's
purpose was largely coterminous with that of English-only programs:
to teach English.219
Despite xenophobic representations to the contrary, 22 bilingual
education as conceived in the BEA was not intended to destabilize the
equation between Americanness and monoglot English fluency. If
anything, the BEA consolidated the equation.221 State laws authoriz-
ing bilingual education mirror the BEA's "deficiency" model. Califor-
nia's Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act of 1976222
is illustrative.
The Act defines bilingual education as building upon non-
English-speaking pupils' (non-English) language skIlls while teaching
English3m Upon first glance, this approach seems to undermine
Americanization's insistence upon linking Americanness with
monoglot English fluency. Closer inspection, however, reveals a seri-
ous qualification: Bilingual education was only to "build-upon"
pupils' native-language skills until they could transfer into English-
medium classrooms3224 California's Act, however, did authorize dual
immersion under the designation "bilingual-bicultural education."4?-S
Nonetheless, the California law ceded considerable power to school
districts to decide the tenor of local programs. " 6 Very few schools
ever created such "bilingual-bicultural" programs. =2 7
218 See Ravitch, supra note 216, at 271.
219 See Nunberg, supra note 40, at 43 ("Today... all publicly supported bilingual educa-
tion programs are aimed at facilitating the transition to English.").
220 Some have gone as far as to equate bilingual education with the consolidation of
Spanish enclaves in the United States. The "enclave" notion seems to invoke the spectral
possibility of violent separatism. See Brimelow, supra note 102, at 77. Brimelow's venom
seems terribly unjustified given how vociferous bilingual education statutes have been in
insisting that bilingual education not "interfere with the s)stematic, sequential, and regular
instruction of all pupils in the English language." Cal. Educ. Code § 30 (West 1994).
221 A poll conducted by University of California-Los Angeles political scientists in 1983
found that the majority of Anglos accepted bilingual education so long as it was designed
to promote the rapid acquisition of English. See Jack Citrin, Language Politics and Ameri-
can Identity, Pub. Interest, Spring 1990, at 96, 98.
222 Cal. Educ. Code § 52160 (West 1994).
223 The point was to ensure that pupils kept up in their non-language subjects while they
were learning English. See id. § 52163(a)(2).
224 See id.
M Id. § 52163(b).
226 In particular, "[t]he governing board of any school district... may determine when
and under what circumstances instruction may be given bilingually." Id. § 30.
227 See Seymour, supra note 205, at B1 (noting existence of only one hundred dual im-
mersion programs in California). One should recall that most California schools never
instituted any sort of bilingual program. See California Fact Book, supra note 15, at 46
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As with any discourse, the bilingual education debate has played
out in an enclosure delimited by certain critical assumptions.
Although ostensibly responding to non-English-speaking students'
needs, bilingual education programs reproduce the equation between
Americanness and monoglot English fluency. This is not to say that
bilingual education and Proposition 227 are the same thing. Although
they emphasized the centrality of English, TBE programs were not
expressly hostile to bilingualism. Proposition 227, on the other hand,
is.228
III
A LEGAL CHALLENGE
One would think that Proposition 227's opponents would be com-
mitted to demonstrating the extent to which it participates in fostering
Anglo hegemony. Instead, legal arguments against the proposition
have congealed primarily around the narrow question of whether the
proposition offers an effective strategy for teaching English.229 Ab-
sent in the anti-Proposition 227 arguments is any trace of the critique
sketched in Parts I and II. Blame, however, cannot be ascribed to the
proposition's legal opponents. The primary legal instruments avail-
able for challenging Proposition 227 do not permit acknowledgement
of its very particular mode of marking otherness.
Neither the EEOA nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-
tection Clause responds to the primary ideological functions Proposi-
tion 227 serves, namely the consolidation of America's white "us. '2 30
To the contrary, the EEOA and the Equal Protection Clause engage
otherness in a way that precludes critical legal response to Proposition
227. The EEOA positions non-English fluency as an essential deficit,
thereby reinscribing the notions of Americanness discussed in Parts
I.C and H.A. Current equal protection jurisprudence responds to dis-
crete, hypostatic others rather than to othering as an ideological pro-
cess. 233 As such, it is not flexible enough to address the relationship
between language, identity, and education policy sketched in Parts I
("Fewer than 30% of LEP students receive primary language instruction."); Seymour,
supra note 46, at Al; supra note 15 and accompanying text.
228 See supra Part I.C.
229 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 1-2, 46-47, Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (No. C
98-2252 CAL). The petitioners' arguments included the following: Proposition 227 vio-
lates the EEOA by not taking appropriate action to overcome language barriers; and Prop-
osition 227 denies language minorities the necessary English language development to
compete with other English-speaking students. See id.
230 See supra Part I.C.
231 See supra Part I.B.
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and I. Instead of asking whether a language classification consoli-
dates the equation between Americanness and whiteness, current
equal protection jurisprudence simply asks whether the interdicted
language 32 is a proxy for some discrete (nonwhite) race. An equal
protection claim might have been viable if Proposition 227 had exclu-
sively prohibited Spanish bilingual education programs. Because
Proposition 227 others in a more sweeping capacity, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause offers little basis for redress.
A. Equal Opportunity
The EEOA is extremely vague as to what states' educational obli-
gations are to non-English-speaking childrenP 3 There is, however,
no doubt that states do have a legal obligation toward such children,
as established by Lau v. Nichols3 4 The Supreme Court, relying upon
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, stated that: "Where inability to speak
and understand the English language excludes national origin-minor-
ity group children.. ., the district must take affirmative steps to rec-
tify the language deficiency .... "235
Congress codified Lau's "appropriate action" language in the
EEOA.236 The EEOA does not prescribe a specific educational
scheme; rather, it requires that school districts "take appropriate ac-
tion to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by
its students in its instructional programs."' 37 Only the Fifth Circuit, in
Castaneda v. Pickard s8 has articulated a test for assessing whether a
school has taken "appropriate action." 239 The Castaneda test asks
whether schools have made a "good faith effort.., to remedy lan-
232 For discussion on "interdiction," see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
233 See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
234 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974). The petitioners in Lau filed suit soon after San Francisco
schools' integration in 1971. At the time, the district had 2856 non-English-speaking Chi-
nese students. Of these students, about 1800 received supplemental English instruction
while about 1000 did not. On behalf of the 1000 students, petitioners argued that the San
Francisco Unified School District was providing unequal educational opportunity. See id.
at 564.
235 Id. at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, however, only casually
suggested what these steps might include; concrete indicia of noncompliance were not
specified. See id. at 564-65.
236 Pub. L 93-380, 88 Stat. 514 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (1994)); see also Lor
A. McMullen & Charlene R. Lynde, Comment, The Official English Movement and the
Demise of Diversity, 32 Land & Water Rev. 789,795 (1997) (discussing congressional codi-
fication of Lau).
237 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1994). In the absence of congressional direction, courts have
had difficulty determining what exactly "appropriate action" should entail. See Valeria G.
v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
238 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).
239 Id. at 1009-10.
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guage deficiencies."240 The test encompasses the following questions:
1) is the program informed by a sound education theory; 2) are school
practices reasonably calculated to implement the educational theory;
and 3) has the plan succeeded. 241 The Castaneda test clearly embraces
a "deficit theory" of language. This is not to say that it is inconsistent
with the EEOA. Regardless, Castaneda is not the only plausible read-
ing of the EEOA.
Castaneda's reading of the EEOA, much like the BEA,
decouples language from identity. The BEA refers to non-English-
speaking children as LEP while the EEOA speaks of "language barri-
ers." In so doing the statutes construct non-English fluency as a de-
racinated problem whose solution need not entail a systematic,
antiracist critique of language policy.242 The BEA reaffirms that
schools should produce monolingual English speakers while
Castaneda's interpretation of the EEOA merely asks whether any
given program effectively achieves that end. Castaneda's interpreta-
tion of the EEOA leaves no room to question the imperative of pro-
ducing monolingual English speakers. The EEOA fixes non-English-
speaking pupils as "deficient." In this context, it is no wonder that the
legal contest over Proposition 227 has revolved almost exclusively
around the narrow question of how best to teach English. A broader
understanding of the EEOA's "appropriate action" language might
constitute the first step in engaging the bilingual education debate's
"other question. '2 43
B. Equal Protection
Petitioners in Valeria G. v. Wilson, the Proposition 227 case, have
constructed an equal protection argument based on minorities' funda-
mental right to participate in the political process. 244 To the extent
240 Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
241 See id. at 1009-10. Castaneda is noticeably silent as to what exactly constitutes a
"sound educational theory." In the case for injunctive relief against Proposition 227, the
court decided that its responsibility only encompassed deciding whether the "school is pur-
suing a program informed by an educational theory recognized as sound by some experts
in the field." Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (internal quotation marks omitted). It may
be that the court in Valeria G. decided not to articulate a more exact definition of "sound
educational theory" because the case was one for injunctive relief. The court had no op-
portunity to answer the third prong of Castaneda's test because it was too soon to deter-
mine whether the plan had succeeded.
242 See Macfas, supra note 209, at 235 (noting that proficiency in non-English language
may qualify students for civil rights law protection).
243 See supra notes 73, 74, 79 and accompanying text.
244 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1023-24. Proposition 227 requires a two-thirds majority in each of
California's two legislative houses for amendment. See Prop. 227, supra note 6, § 335,
Petitioners argue that because Proposition 227 inordinately affects national-origin minori-
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that the Equal Protection Clause represents one of the courts' primary
instruments for responding to state-sponsored racism,2 45 it is some-
what surprising that Proposition 227's opponents have responded with
timidity. Their argument does not even begin to speak to the educa-
tional scheme Proposition 227 inaugurates.2 46 Current equal protec-
tion jurisprudence does not allow for constructive engagement of the
problems outlined in Part I. The discussion below will sketch equal
protection's inadequacy without undertaking the arduous task of pro-
posing an alternative.
By the terms of current equal protection jurisprudence, courts
will examine a contested classification with heightened scrutiny if it:
1) burdens a fundamental right,247 2) is shown to have been animated
by discriminatory intent,248 or 3) is inherently "suspect."2 49 In the ab-
sence of one of these factors, courts need only look to whether the
contested policy is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.250
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,251 the
Supreme Court held that the right to an education is not "fundamen-
tal.' 'z52 Supported by this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that the
ties and because, prior to 227's passage, curricular change could be affected by local polit-
ical action, Proposition 227 unduly burdens minorities' fundamental rights to participate in
the political process. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1023-24.
245 See Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("A core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on
race."). Some would argue that the Supreme Court has never used the Fourteenth
Amendment meaningfully to promote racial justice. See Donald E. Lively & Stephen
Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of Denial and Evasion, 40 Am. U. L Rev.
1307, 1311 (1991) ("With rare exceptions, the Supreme Court... has formulated legal
principles and standards that have avoided, rather than confronted, racial injustice.").
246 Judge Legge noted as much in Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
247 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18 (1982) (explaining operation of funda-
mental rights analysis in equal protection context).
248 This standard is applied to so-called "facially neutral" policies. See, e.g., Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,264-65 (1977) (holding that showing of
discriminatory intent is necessary in order to trigger strict scrutiny regardless of whether
there is disparate impact); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39, 242 (1976) (same).
249 This basis for strict scrutiny's application was first articulated in Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), with reference to race. "[A]II legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect .... [Clourts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216. In Korenmatsu, the Court found that the Japa-
nese internment passed strict scrutiny. See id. at 217-18. Korenatsu is one of very few
cases in which an outwardly racist law was upheld under strict scrutiny. See Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Constitutional Conflicts, pt. 1, at 200 (1997).
250 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (ex-
plaining rational basis review). Rational basis review is very relaxed. The legislative classi-
fication need not be perfect. It simply cannot be irrational. Under rational basis review,
the statutory classification is virtually presumed legitimate. See id.
251 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
252 See id. at 33-35. But Rodriguez conceded that education is one of the state's most
important responsibilities. See id. at 29. Although the Court found that a rational rela-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
November 1999]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Equal Protection Clause imposes no duty to provide bilingual educa-
tion.253 In Proposition 227's case, proving discriminatory intent would
be nearly as futile as arguing for the existence of a fundamental right
to bilingual education. 254
Intuitively, Proposition 227 seems to enunciate a suspect classifi-
cation. The notion of a "suspect" legal classification descends from
the famous fourth footnote of United States v. Carolene Products
Co.255 In that note, Justice Stone suggested that the Supreme Court
would be willing to review legislation with more exacting scrutiny in
the interest of protecting "discrete and insular minorities" from
majoritarian tyranny.256 Footnote four's terms suggest an immediate
limitation for challenging racially inflected language classifications.
Non-English speakers are not even vaguely "discrete and insular." In
addition, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to extend heightened
scrutiny to anything but a few ostensibly "discrete" classifications. 257
These classifications include: race, 2 s national origin,2 59 sex,2 60 alien-
tionship to a legitimate state purpose existed in the school financing scheme at issue in
Rodriguez, the Court suggested that such a relationship may be absent when the educa-
tional scheme fails to provide children with the opportunity to learn the most basic skills.
See id. at 37.
253 See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist., 587 F.2d 1022, 1027 (9th
Cir. 1978). For discussion of this case, see supra note 167.
254 Proving discriminatory intent is very difficult. Evidence of disparate impact is not
enough to prove discriminatory intent unless the disparate impact is exceptionally stark.
See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. at 266. A plaintiff must
prove that the legislative or administrative body whose decision is being challenged made
its decision "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Charles Lawrence III has
argued that a discriminatory intent standard places too large a burden on the wrong side in
cases involving "facially neutral" policies that have disparate racial effects. See Lawrence,
supra note 16, at 319.
255 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
256 See id. at 153 n.4 ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a spe-
cial condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.")
257 See Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating,
Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 937, 937 (1991) (noting Supreme Court's re-
luctance to recognize new groups as suspect).
258 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226-27 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny to race-based federal transportation department set-aside program); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to Virginia's antimiscegenation
statute); see also supra note 249.
259 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,273-74 (1986) (applying strict
scrutiny to public schools' national origin-based proportional-layoff provision).
260 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1994) (applying inter-
mediate scrutiny to gender-based peremptory strikes); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Ho-
gan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (applying intermediate scrutiny to nursing school's
gender-based admission policy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976) (applying in-
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age,261 and illegitimacy.262 The Court has never provided a clear ex-
planation as to why these five classifications deserve heightened
scrutiny and others do not.263
Proposition 227's language classification implicates race in a re-
gressive way; the proposition's "English learner" designation consoli-
dates the subjective position of a "non-English learner." 64 In so
doing, the language classification reproduces a racially loaded concept
of Americanness.265 As the Supreme Court's current equal protection
jurisprudence stands, however, a language classification as such would
not qualify for heightened scrutiny. Although the current jurispru-
dence "privileges the talismanic classification[ ] of race,"' 66 language
is not thought of as marking race except in rare cases where a lan-
guage classification appears to track a "discrete" racial group.
The Supreme Court has never held that language might function
as a proxy for race in the context of an equal protection claim. In
Hernandez v. New York,267 the Court refused to answer the question
definitively.2 In dicta, however, the Court acknowledged that for
some groups it may be necessary to treat "proficiency in a particular
language... as a surrogate for race .... -269 For now, it remains true
termediate scrutiny to gender-based alcohol sale statute). As the designation suggests, "in-
termediate scrutiny" lies between strict scrutiny and rational basis review. In particular,
passing intermediate scrutiny requires that the contested law be substantially related to an
important governmental objective. See id. at 197. Passing strict scrutiny, however, re-
quires that the contested law be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental
purpose. See Adarand Constructors, Ina, 515 U.S. at 227.
261 See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1977) (applying strict scrutiny to state
statute restricting college financial aid to resident aliens); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 641-43 (1973) (applying "close scrutiny" to flat, state statutory ban on noncitizens for
competitive civil service jobs); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (apply-
ing strict scrutiny to statute that denied welfare benefits to noncitizens).
M See, e.g., Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854-56 (1986) (applying heightened scru-
tiny to Texas prohibition on illegitimate child inheriting from father); Pickett v. Brov,, 462
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983) (applying intermediate scrutiny to restriction on support suits by illegiti-
mate children).
2M See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Pre-
sumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 Yale LI. 485, 559 (1998).
264 See supra Part LC.
265 See supra Part LC.
266 Yoshino, supra note 263, at 487.
267 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
268 The petitioner charged that the prosecutor in his criminal trial used his peremptory
challenges to exclude Latinaslos from the jury in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The prosecutor excluded Spanish-speaking jurors for fear that they would follow Spanish-
speaking witnesses' actual testimony rather than that of the translator. See id. at 355-57.
The petitioner argued, in part, that Spanish language ability is a proxy for ethnicity. The
Supreme Court, however, decided that it was not necessary to reach the issue. See id. at
359-60.
269 Id. at 371.
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that classifications distinguishing English from non-English-speaking
peoples do not trigger heightened scrutiny. No circuit has held that a
language classification alone will suffice as a justification for strict
scrutiny's application. 270 In cases where the language classification
tracks a "discrete and insular" national origin group/race, however,
strict scrutiny might be applied.
The Ninth Circuit is one of the only circuits that actually has ap-
plied heightened scrutiny to a language classification in the context of
an equal protection claim. In Olagues v. Russoniello ,271 the Ninth Cir-
cuit had to answer whether a U.S. Attorney's Office investigation into
voter fraud was unconstitutional.272 The investigation targeted immi-
grant voters who requested bilingual ballots (which were only avail-
able in Spanish and Chinese). 273 In declaring the investigation
unconstitutional, the court looked to the facts that those investigated
were all foreign-born, recently registered voters, and had requested
bilingual ballots.274 These three characteristics coupled with the fact
that those investigated were necessarily Spanish or Chinese speaking
justified strict scrutiny's application.27 5 The Ninth Circuit stated that
for all practical purposes, the language classification at issue was a
race-based classification. The court, however, reiterated that non-
English/English-speaking classifications are neutral without additional
indicia of suspectness. 276
The extent to which current equal protection jurisprudence con-
structs language classifications as racially neutral is troublesome. As
matters stand, language classifications are almost presumed neutral.
The more general a language classification is, the more forceful the
presumption. The presumption stems from the requirement that ad-
vocates show a concrete relationship between the interdicted lan-
guage277 and a "discrete" other. Such a requirement ignores the
extent to which a general language classification might function as an
interdiction-an interdiction that consolidates racially specific ideas
about Americanness. 278
270 See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
providing Social Security notices only in English does not violate Spanish-speaking plain-
tiffs' equal protection rights); Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1218 (6th Cir. 1975) (hold-
ing that civil service exam administered in English does not violate Spanish-speaking
plaintiffs' equal protection rights).
271 797 F.2d 1511, 1520-21 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
272 See id. at 1513-15.
273 See id.
274 See id. at 1521.
275 See id.
276 See id.
277 For discussion on "interdiction," see supra note 89 and accompanying text.
278 See supra Parts I.C, II.
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Equal protection jurisprudence allows little room for challenging
state action that uses language to mark otherness in as vast and
sweeping a gesture as Proposition 227 does. As Part I.B and II.A
sought to show, the American "core's" social intelligibility as "core" is
dependent upon marking those who do not constitute it. Although
such marking may take form in the articulation of one "discrete" ra-
cial other, it often does not.
Statutory schemes like Proposition 227 do not evoke racist mean-
ing or produce racist effects by naming a specific racial other.279 Re-
quiring the presentation of a "discrete minority" cabins the legal
inquiry. In schemes like Proposition 227, it is the self that finds speci-
ficity, not the other. In particular, the self finds specificity through a
generalized articulation of who cannot call English his or her own.
This proposition confirms that language is a proxy for race. The race,
however, like the language does not belong to the other.
CONCLUSION
Proposition 227 rearticulates a lingual birthright: What is ours is
reaffirmed through Proposition 227's violent exhortation to the other
to learn English. It is important, however, not to romanticize the myr-
iad bilingual education programs that preceded Proposition 227. With
the exception of dual immersion schemes, bilingual programs also
functioned as racially inflected exhortations-albeit gentler, more
modulated ones. Successful dual immersion programs may suggest a
model for responding to the critiques sketched in this Note. For now,
however, the birthright stands forcefully rearticulated.
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APPENDIX 8 0
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-
ENGLISH LANGUAGE
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS-INITIATIVE STATUTE
Proposition 227
This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance
with the provisions of Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution.
PROPOSED LAW
SECTION 1. Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 300) is added
to Part 1 of the Education Code, to read:
CHAPTER 3. ENGLISH LANGUAGE EDUCATION FOR
IMMIGRANT CHILDREN
Article 1. Findings and Declarations
300. The People of California find and declare as follows:
(a) Whereas, The English language is the national public lan-
guage of the United States of America and of the State of California,
is spoken by the vast majority of California residents, and is also the
leading world language for science, technology, and international
business, thereby being the language of economic opportunity; and
(b) Whereas, Immigrant parents are eager to have their children
acquire a good knowledge of English, thereby allowing them to fully
participate in the American Dream of economic and social advance-
ment; and
(c) Whereas, The government and the public schools of Califor-
nia have a moral obligation and a constitutional duty to provide all of
California's children, regardless of their ethnicity or national origins,
with the skills necessary to become productive members of our soci-
ety, and of these skills, literacy in the English language is among the
most important; and
(d) Whereas, The public schools of California currently do a
poor job of educating immigrant children, wasting financial resources
on costly experimental language programs whose failure over the past
two decades is demonstrated by the current high drop-out rates and
low English literacy levels of many immigrant children; and
280 The following is the text of Proposition 227, the antibilingual education initiative
approved by California voters on June 2, 1998. See supra notes 6-22 and accompanying
text.
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(e) Whereas, Young immigrant children can easily acquire full
fluency in a new language, such as English, if they are heavily exposed
to that language in the classroom at an early age.
(f) Therefore, It is resolved that: all children in California public
schools shall be taught English as rapidly and effectively as possible.
Article 2. English Language Education
305. Subject to the exceptions provided in Article 3 (commencing
with Section 310), all children in California public schools shall be
taught English by being taught in English. In particular, this shall re-
quire that all children be placed in English language classrooms. Chil-
dren who are English learners shall be educated through sheltered
English immersion during a temporary transition period not normally
intended to exceed one year. Local schools shall be permitted to
place in the same classroom English learners of different ages but
whose degree of English proficiency is similar. Local schools shall be
encouraged to mix together in the same classroom English learners
from different native-language groups but with the same degree of
English fluency. Once English learners have acquired a good working
knowledge of English, they shall be transferred to English language
mainstream classrooms. As much as possible, current supplemental
funding for English learners shall be maintained, subject to possible
modification under Article 8 (commencing with Section 335) below.
306. The definitions of the terms used in this article and in Arti-
cle 3 (commencing with Section 310) are as follows:
(a) "English learner" means a child who does not speak English
or whose native language is not English and who is not currently able
to perform ordinary classroom work in English, also known as a Lim-
ited English Proficiency or LEP child.
(b) "English language classroom" means a classroom in which
the language of instruction used by the teaching personnel is over-
whelmingly the English language, and in which such teaching person-
nel possess a good knowledge of the English language.
(c) "English language mainstream classroom" means a classroom
in which the pupils either are native English language speakers or al-
ready have acquired reasonable fluency in English.
(d) "Sheltered English immersion" or "structured English im-
mersion" means an English language acquisition process for young
children in which nearly all classroom instruction is in English but
with the curriculum and presentation designed for children who are
learning the language.
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(e) "Bilingual education/native language instruction" means a
language acquisition process for pupils in which much or all instruc-
tion, textbooks, and teaching materials are in the child's native
language.
Article 3. Parental Exceptions
310. The requirements of Section 305 may be waived with the
prior written informed consent, to be provided annually, of the child's
parents or legal guardian under the circumstances specified below and
in Section 311. Such informed consent shall require that said parents
or legal guardian personally visit the school to apply for the waiver
and that they there be provided a full description of the educational
materials to be used in the different educational program choices and
all the educational opportunities available to the child. Under such
parental waiver conditions, children may be transferred to classes
where they are taught English and other subjects through bilingual
education techniques or other generally recognized educational meth-
odologies permitted by law. Individual schools in which 20 pupils or
more of a given grade level receive a waiver shall be required to offer
such a class; otherwise, they must allow the pupils to transfer to a
public school in which such a class is offered.
311. The circumstances in which a parental exception waiver may
be granted under Section 310 are as follows:
(a) Children who already know English: the child already pos-
sesses good English language skills, as measured by standardized tests
of English vocabulary comprehension, reading, and writing, in which
the child scores at or above the state average for his or her grade level
or at or above the 5th grade average, whichever is lower; or
(b) Older children: the child is age 10 years or older, and it is the
informed belief of the school principal and educational staff that an
alternate course of educational study would be better suited to the
child's rapid acquisition of basic English language skills; or
(c) Children with special needs: the child already has been
placed for a period of not less than thirty days during that school year
in an English language classroom and it is subsequently the informed
belief of the school principal and educational staff that the child has
such special physical, emotional, psychological, or educational needs
that an alternate course of educational study would be better suited to
the child's overall educational development. A written description of
these special needs must be provided and any such decision is to be
made subject to the examination and approval of the local school su-
perintendent, under guidelines established by and subject to the re-
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view of the local Board of Education and ultimately the State Board
of Education. The existence of such special needs shall not compel
issuance of a waiver, and the parents shall be fully informed of their
right to refuse to agree to a waiver.
Article 4. Community-Based English Tutoring
315. In furtherance of its constitutional and legal requirement to
offer special language assistance to children coming from backgrounds
of limited English proficiency, the state shall encourage family mem-
bers and others to provide personal English language tutoring to such
children, and support these efforts by raising the general level of Eng-
lish language knowledge in the community. Commencing with the fis-
cal year in which this initiative is enacted and for each of the nine
fiscal years following thereafter, a sum of fifty million dollars
($50,000,000) per year is hereby appropriated from the General Fund
for the purpose of providing additional funding for free or subsidized
programs of adult English language instruction to parents or other
members of the community who pledge to provide personal English
language tutoring to California school children with limited English
proficiency.
316. Programs funded pursuant to this section shall be provided
through schools or community organizations. Funding for these pro-
grams shall be administered by the Office of the Superintendent of
Public Instruction, and shall be disbursed at the discretion of the local
school boards, under reasonable guidelines established by, and subject
to the review of, the State Board of Education.
Article 5. Legal Standing and Parental Enforcement
320. As detailed in Article 2 (commencing with Section 305) and
Article 3 (commencing with Section 310), all California school chil-
dren have the right to be provided with an English language public
education. If a California school child has been denied the option of
an English language instructional curriculum in public school, the
child's parent or legal guardian shall have legal standing to sue for
enforcement of the provisions of this statute, and if successful shall be
awarded normal and customary attorney's fees and actual damages,
but not punitive or consequential damages. Any school board mem-
ber or other elected official or public school teacher or administrator
who willfully and repeatedly refuses to implement the terms of this
statute by providing such an English language educational option at
an available public school to a California school child may be held
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personally liable for fees and actual damages by the child's parents or
legal guardian.
Article 6. Severability
325. If any part or parts of this statute are found to be in conflict
with federal law or the United States or the California State Constitu-
tion, the statute shall be implemented to the maximum extent that
federal law, and the United States and the California State Constitu-
tion permit. Any provision held invalid shall be severed from the re-
maining portions of this statute.
Article 7 Operative Date
330. This initiative shall become operative for all school terms
which begin more than sixty days following the date on which it be-
comes effective.
Article 8. Amendment
335. The provisions of this act may be amended by a statute that
becomes effective upon approval by the electorate or by a statute to
further the act's purpose passed by a two-thirds vote of each house of
the Legislature and signed by the Governor.
Article 9. Interpretation
340. Under circumstances in which portions of this statute are
subject to conflicting interpretations, Section 300 shall be assumed to
contain the governing intent of the statute.
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